D u rin g th e p ast q u a rte r century, co m m en tato rs co n c e rn e d a b o u tju stic e fo r w o m en a n d racial m in o rities have a rg u e d th a t social c o n tra c t th eo ry is in h e re n tly flawed. F ar fro m offering a firm fo u n d a tio n o n w hich to b u ild com p reh en siv e c o n c u rre n ce a b o u t ju stice, these critics co n ten d , th e c o n tra c t m o d e l enables m u tu a l a g re e m e n t only w ithin th e b o u n d aries o f a n "in -g ro u p /o u t-g ro u p " fram e.1 P atem an, fo r exam ple, has a rg u e d th a t th e c o n tra c t m o d el reach es only a restrictive m utuality th a t privileges m e n a n d d en ies reco g n itio n to w o m en.2 Mills has sim ilarly claim ed th a t c o n tra c t th e o ry positions A frican A m ericans a t a disadvan-* Silvers gave a brief version o f this article at the Am erican Philosophical Association Pacific Division m eeting in San Francisco (M arch 2003) during a panel o n M artha Nussb aum 's T anner lectures. We th en wrote "(R e)m odeling Social C ontract Theory: Resolving the 'O utlier' Problem with Trusteeship a n d Trust" for the Law a n d Society Association m eeting (Pittsburgh, Ju n e 2003). "Justice th ro u g h Trust" expands o n these presentations, w hich were b oth stim ulated a n d inform ed by N ussbaum 's T anner lectures. We are very grateful to Carlos Ball a n d Jo n a th a n Wolff for com m enting on versions o f "Justice through Trust" a n d for the enorm ously helpful advice received from participants at the workshop o n disability conducted by C hristopher W ellman a n d Andrew C ohen at the Je a n Beer B lum enfeld C enter for Ethics at Georgia State University in May 2004. We are grateful to M artha Nussbaum for h e r clear, powerful, a n d innovative fram ing o f challenges that disability poses for political theory. Special thanks are due to Larry Becker for patient readings, p en etrating observations, a n d productive suggestions th at carried us through several drafts. M ore re c e n t versions of th e "o u tlie r p ro b le m " charge th a t social co n tra c t th e o ry stands b etw een p eo p le w ith disabilities a n d ju stic e .4 T he co m p la in t is th a t social co n tra c t theory, u n d e rsto o d as a process of b a rg ain in g fo r m u tu a l advantage, is so flawed th a t it c a n n o t do ju stice to p erso n s w ith disabilities. T h e faults a re in trinsic a n d n o t rep airab le fro m w ithin social c o n tra c t th eo ry itself. Injustices th a t disabled p eo p le suffer-a n d th a t im p in g e o n th e ir intim ates, allies, a n d advocates-may n o t even be acknow ledged in p rin cip le unless social co n tra c t th e o ry is rep laced . P ro m p te d by such concerns, social c o n tra c t critics have ad van ced a n ethics o f care (Kittay), o r a capability th e o ry o f th e good (N ussbaum ), as p re fe ra b le to social co n tra c t th eo ry because m o re re sponsive to th e situ atio n o f th e disabled.5
T his line o f o b jectio n is u n d e rsta n d a b le a n d im p o rtan t, fo r it could reveal a n u n fo rtu n a te exclusivity in social c o n tra c t theory. To lea rn w h e th e r th e "o u tlie r p ro b le m " does discover such narrow ness, we begin by ex p lain in g why u n d e rsta n d in g th e initial in te ra c tio n betw een con tracto rs as a b a rg ain in g process o p en s social c o n tra c t th eo ry to the ch arg e o f a b a n d o n in g "o u tliers." T h e id e a th a t ju stic e is m ainly a m atter o f d istrib u tin g benefits p ro d u c e d by m u tu al co o p e ra tio n a m o n g those capable o f c o n trib u tin g exacerbates th e difficulty.6 Ju stice so co n stru ed seem s aim ed a t (re )a llo c atin g resources in a m a n n e r th a t is sufficiently 3. Charles Mills, The Racial Contract (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). A nd see also A nn Cudd, "C ontractarianism ," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, online at h ttp ://p la to .s ta n fo rd .e d u /.
4. Cudd, "C ontractarianism ." 5. Eva Kittay, Love' s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency (New York: Routledge, 1999), a n d "W hen Care IsJu st a n d Ju stice Is Caring: T he Case o f the Care for the Mentally R etarded," Public Culture 13 (2001): 557-79. See M artha N ussbaum 's "Beyond the Social Contract: Toward Global Justice," T anner L ectures in H um an Values, Australian National University, Canberra, N ovem ber [12] [13] 2002 , full text at h ttp ://p h ilrsss.a n u .e d u .a u /ta n n e r/. N ussbaum 's incisive analysis of why contem porary social contract theory excludes the disabled inspired the present article.
6. Many contem porary philosophical discussions of justice do not venture beyond distributive justice. But narrow ing justice to the distribution of resources is a luxury re served to "in-groups" already granted full procedural inclusion in society. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) illustrates why "outliers" may wish to seek procedural justice first. Plaintiffs com plained about th eir inability to access Tennessee courtroom s. O ne wheelchair user was jailed w hen he failed to crawl back up the stairs after a recess, while county officials stood by laughing. Another, also unable to reach a courtroom upstairs, lost a civil suit brought against him by a neighbor. T he exclusion of w heelchair users from access to the courts is a fundam ental injustice but n o t initially a m atter of resource distribution. However, n o t everyone sees denial o f access to the justice system as a prim a facie injustice, as Justice Scalia m ade clear by his statem ents during oral argum ent.
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October 2005 ag reeab le to th e p arties w ho p ro d u c e d th e m to p ro lo n g th e ir m u tu al co o p eratio n . T his p ic tu re divides "in-groups," p eo p le w ho particip ate in cooperatively prod u ctive activities, fro m "o u tliers," p eo p le w ho do n o t. If ju stic e flows a t all across th e line fro m th e fo rm e r to th e latter, it m ay be only a trickle w h en it arrives.
T h e line m arks th e exclusion fro m w hich w o m en a n d racial m i n o rities have b e e n said to suffer. F alsehoods a b o u t biological inferiority have fu eled biased beliefs a b o u t th e ir lim ited capacities to b arg ain stra tegically o r to re c ip ro c ate co n tractu al benefits. O f course, rejectin g the e rro n e o u s assum ptions th a t form erly lim ited o p p o rtu n itie s for w om en a n d racial m in o rities can b rin g us to recognize th a t they too may be bargain ers. T h e "o u tlie r p ro b le m " thus may be resolved in th e ir cases by assim ilating th e m to successful bargainers, possibly co m p en sated for p ast bias to p e rm it b a rg ain in g o n a m o re eq u al basis (a lth o u g h assim ilatio n m ay sh ro u d p ro p e rtie s they value in them selves).
N o t so th e disabled, w hose differences seem to defy assim ilation.7 In Section III, consequently, we explore how co n stru in g th e social con tra c t as a b a rg ain in g process has b e e n th o u g h t to distance disabled p e o p le -e ith e r collectively o r as individuals w hose differences im p ed e o r p re c lu d e b a rg ain in g -fro m contract-based ju stic e. M ore specifically, in Sections IV, V, a n d VI, we co nsider N u ssb au m 's ch allen g in g arg u m en ts th a t th e history o f social c o n tra c t theory, a n d its core m o ral a n d political ideas, ex clu d e th e disabled fro m th e co n trac tin g process th a t gives rise to ju stice.
To rectify these problem s, N ussbaum w ould rep lace c o n tra c t th e ory 's em phasis o n p ro c e d u ra l ju stic e w ith goals fo r d istrib u tio n o f the good. To th e contrary, we arg u e in Section VII, c o n tra c t th eo ry by itself does n o t co n stitu te d isabled p e o p le as "o u tliers." T h e p ro b le m is the im p o sitio n o f a successful b arg ain er p arad ig m o n contracting. B ut social co n tra c t th e o ry n e e d n o t em brace th e b a rg a in e r parad ig m .8 In d e ed , 7 . See Anita Silvers, David W asserman, a n d Mary Mahowald, Disability, Difference, Dis crimination: Perspectives on Justice in Bioethics and Public Policy (Lanham , Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).
8. O n the contem porary legal understanding o f contracts, it may be h a rd to imagine a contract that has been forged w ithout bargaining. C onsideration, req u ired in all U.S. states except Louisiana, is at the core of the bargaining m odel. O n pre-nineteenth-century understandings, however, exchange of consideration is n o t the only cause o r reason parties may com e to gether in contractual agreem ent. A contract may grow out o f agreem ent for which th ere is sufficient cause b u t n o t necessarily reciprocal consideration, as in traditional social contract theory. U nlike the nineteenth-century requirem ent that each contractor receive som ething in exchange (consideration), the older, b roader n otion is m ore tolerant o f contractors agreeing to act m utually because o f other-regarding reasons. A strength of the new idea o f a contract, which requires m utual consideration, is to protect excessively other-regarding individuals from the enforcem ent o f arrangem ents that categorically dis miss their own interest. A strength of the older version, which requires only cause, is to this in te rp re ta tio n b ears th e m a rk o f a com paratively recen t, n in e te e n thcen tu ry legal th eo ry o f co ntracting, o n e th a t has c o n tin u e d to be influ en tial b u t has also b e e n th e subject o f o n g o in g criticism .9 N or m u st p h ilo so p h ical u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e social co n tract, w hich is su p p o sed to be p rio r to a n d fo u n d a tio n a l for th e state, co n fo rm to prevailing d efin itio n s o f a legally en fo rceab le contract.
N o r n e e d th e h u m a n in te ra c tio n fro m w hich th e social co n tra c t is su p p o sed to em erg e be th o u g h t o f narrow ly as a process o f bargaining. T h e b ro a d e r c o n c e p tio n we in tro d u c e , akin to H a m p to n 's re a d in g o f th e social c o n tra c t in term s o f social con v en tio n s,10 sees social co n tract in g as m o re like a p ro je c t for e n g e n d e rin g tru st th a n a barg ain in g session. P rinciples o f ju stic e e d u c e d w ith a n eye tow ard p ro m o tin g a tru st cu ltu re a n d a clim ate o f tru st m ay n o t differ dram atically fro m the o nes idealized strategic b arg ain ers w ould ad o p t. Yet th e ir source is n o t a n exclusionary "in -g ro u p " process.
In p u rsu it o f these them es, in Section VIII we ex p lo re how devel o p in g consensus th ro u g h m u tu al tru st is n o t like rea ch in g su ch ag ree m e n t th ro u g h b arg ain in g . D isabled p eo p le w ho c a n n o t b arg ain still can trust. A nd they can play a cen tral role, n o t m erely a p e rip h e ra l o r partial on e, in stre n g th e n in g a clim ate o f tru st fro m w hich covenants for co o p e ra tio n c o m e .11 In Section IX, we address th e political progressiveness enable other-regarding individuals to re n d er non-self-interested arrangem ents systematic a n d reliable.
9. State control of the term s o f contracting took h old aro u n d 1870. See Dori Kimel, From Promise to Contract: Towards a Liberal Theory ofContract (Oxford: H art Publishing, 2003), 118. To guard especially vulnerable individuals against exploitative contractual arrange m ents a n d thereby to fu rth e r the state's interest in protecting them , the law typically sets standards for p articipation in the contracting process a n d for the c o n ten t o f the agreem ent itself. Protecting disabled people (and others who are vulnerable as well) from being d u p ed o r coerced into contracting by stipulating standards that exem pt them is consistent with the w ell-docum ented nineteenth-century m ovem ent that rem oved disabled people from civic and com m ercial participation by institutionalizing them for their own good. As with o th er paternalistic provisions o f the law, such exem ptions result in a com plex mix o f benefits a n d harm s. We should notice, however, th a t this legal definition is o f "con tractual activity [that] is pursued within a fram ework which is largely created, and the boundaries of which are largely defined, by the state" (ibid., 125). We surely n e ed n o t assume th at a legal definition o f contract designed by the state to serve its purposes exhausts ideas o f contracting th at may be invoked in our m oral a n d political understanding o f the foundation o f the state. And, in any case, a good deal of recent legal scholarship on contract law aims at b roadening the idea of contracting.
10. H am pton regarded this kind o f contract as a m atter o f the parties expressing tacit o r im plicit consent th ro u g h discretionary participation in convention-guided social or political interactions ra th e r th an th ro u g h explicit a n d direct exchange o f reciprocal ben efits. See Je a n H am pton, "C ontract a n d C onsent," in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, ed. R obert G oodin and Philip Pettit (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 379-93, 383.
11. A clim ate of trust supports p e o p le 's d epending on the econom ic, political, or legal system a n d therefore contributes to social stability.
October 2005 th a t co n tra c tin g th ro u g h cultivating tru st prom ises disabled p eo p le a n d o th e r outliers. A cen tral th e m e o f a tru st cu lture, as d istinct fro m a barg ain in g cu ltu re, is th a t n o o n e sh o u ld have to b e a n "outlier."12 In a tru st culture, u n lik e in a b a rg a in in g culture, disabled a n d n o n d isa b led p eo p le can be equally im p o rta n t p articip an ts in, a n d equally im p o rta n t beneficiaries of, th e system atically fair tre a tm e n t th a t is th e goal o f social contracting. F urther, as B aier observes, "A system-econom ic, legal, o r politicalre q u ire s trust. . . . W ith o u t tru st it c a n n o t stim ulate supportive activities in situations o f u n c e rta in ty o r risk. . . . W here th e societal a n d insti tu tio n a l co n d itio n s o f tru st a re m et, th e re will be w illingness to take risks to su p p o rt th e stru c tu re a n d also to v en tu re to try to im prove it."13 C o n tra c tin g w ith tru st th u s seem s to b e a p rom ising way o f p u rsu in g progressive ju stic e fo r "o u tliers," in c lu d in g disabled p eo p le.
C e n tra l to th e p o in t o f co n tra ctin g is th a t each party is resp ected as in som e b ro a d sense b ein g a chooser. C onsequently, each also stands as a source for ju stifying political a n d m o ra l claim s a n d for th e self m otivation to com ply w ith th em . Such e n g a g e m e n t o n th e p a rt o f the p arties in d u ces th e m to be m o re reliable a n d facilitates th e stability o f th e w hole society as well. M aking individual reliability a n d social stability in te g ra l to achieving ju stic e fo r all is a n especially attractive p ro sp ect fo r disabled p eo p le, w hose lim itations leave th e m less resilien t a n d m o re v u ln erab le to social diso rganization a n d discord. T h e challenge disabled p e o p le pose for social c o n tra c t th e o ry has b e e n m isplaced a n d m isun d ersto o d . To em b race th em , philo so p h ical th eo ry n e e d n o t discard the ideal th a t ju stic e in p rin cip le sh o u ld e m erg e fro m c o m m itted partici p a tio n by all. M eeting th e challenge req u ires in stead lettin g go o f the p re su m p tio n th a t cooperative h u m a n behavior red u ces to reite ra tio n s o f recip ro cal dyadic in teractio n s betw een sim ilarly p o sitio n ed in d i viduals.
C o o p e ra tio n can ra n g e fro m ru d im e n ta ry p e rso n al e n c o u n te rs b e tw een individuals to so p histicated collective political in teractio n s th a t a re p ro m p te d by historically e n tre n c h e d expectations a n d by th e social a n d cu ltu ral practices o f groups. In te rp e rso n a l c o n n ectio n s o f th e first sort-specifically, prim itive p e rso n al exp erien ces o f tru stin g a n d being tru ste d -a re very im p o rta n t to th e d ev elo p m en t o f ju stic e. B ut th e p ro 12. A culture o f trust supports p e o p le 's d e pending on each o th er a n d therefore supports individual reliability.
13. A nnette Baier, "Trusting People," Philosophical Perspectives: Ethics 6 (1992): 137-53, 151. B aier's analysis of trust, in "Trust a n d A ntitrust," Ethics 96 (1986): 231-60, a n d in o th er writings of hers cited th ro u g h o u t this essay, deeply influences o u r discussion. We do not, however, follow Baier in exiling contracting to the m argins of morality. T hat is because B aier's critique adopts a needlessly narrow idea o f contracting, one that construes it as exchange am ong similarly situated bargainers. cess is reflexive because th e o cc u rren ce o f sp o n tan e o u s basic tru st re lationships in tu rn is facilitated by th e assurance o f justice.
Ju stice reigns, we arg ue, in virtue o f having b e e n sh ap ed in response to th e n e e d o f "o u tliers" to achieve successful p erso n a l tru st re latio n ships.14 F ro m th e ir flo u rish in g com es a clim ate o f g en e ra l co n fidence in th e com p reh en siv e em b race o f ju stic e. C en tral to cooperative schem es are relatio n sh ip s th a t do n o t necessarily p ro d u c e dyadic ex ch anges o f ben efits b etw een pairs o f parties b u t th a t resu lt im p o rtan tly in ben eficial social by-products th a t are secu red because parties with d iffe re n t levels a n d kinds o f vulnerability successfully co o p erate. O n this m o re com plex p ictu re, th e discretionary c o m m itm en t to tru stin g each o th e r by p arties w hose capabilities differ sustains co o p era tio n n o t b e cause th e p arties necessarily rec ip ro c ate directly to each o th e r b u t b e cause th e ir in teractio n s e n ric h a n o th e r k in d o f entity, th e cooperative schem e ( o r th e social clim ate, th e com m unity cu ltu re, o r society itself).
D isabled p e o p le a n d o th e r "o u tliers" can particip ate actively in such triadic relationships. In d o in g so, disabled p eo p le a n d o th e r "o u tliers" n o t only e n tru st them selves to, b u t also a re tru sted by, th e re st o f the com m unity. Such relatio n ships can be transform ative for all parties.
C are a n d capability theories, th e alternatives m ost o ften p ro p o se d as b e tte r able to provide for disabled p eo p le th a n c o n tra c t theory, divide p e o p le in to sharply d iffe re n t roles. C are th e o ry 's focus is to su p p o rt active caregiving. Capability th e o ry 's focus is activating th e co n trib u tio n s p e o p le w ith surplus capability can m ake to capability-deficient people. O n b o th accounts, "o u tliers" typically are co n fin e d to th e role o f passive recip ien t. If "o u tliers" a ttain status as parties in social contracting, how ever, they are draw n in to th e active m utuality in h e re n t in th e co n tractin g process, a n effective a n tid o te to th e isolation o f b ein g a n "outlier."
II. BRINGING T H E "O U T-GROUPS" IN
C o n tem p o rary ju stic e th e o ry o ften envisions social co n trac tin g th ro u g h a Rawlsian lens, in term s o f conversations am o n g parties w ho choose m u tu a l acco m m o d a tio n th ro u g h a process o f com ing to a g re e m e n t a b o u t ju stice. To m ak e th e p ro sp e c t o f rea ch in g a g re e m e n t plausible, th e p arties p articip atin g in th e process are p re su m e d to be roughly equiv alen t to each o th e r in stre n g th , skills, sm artness, sensibilities, a n d status a n d to resem b le each o th e r b o th in b ein g capable o f a n d in seeking sovereignty over them selves. All parties are th e re fo re similarly well p o sitio n ed to convince th e o th e rs to acce p t th e ir ideas a b o u t the basic ten ets o f ju stic e . T h e h o m o g en eity o f th e parties in d u ces each to 14.
Historically, m em bers o f groups such as racial m inorities, women, a n d the disabled have been "outliers," b u t in principle anyone m ight be exiled to the m argin o f society a n d thereby becom e an "outlier."
take th e o th e rs as seriously as each takes him self, so th a t th e ideas them selves, ra th e r th a n th e ir p ro p o n e n ts, can b e said to d ecide the outcom e.
O n a Rawlsian acco u n t, th e sim ilarity o f th e parties enables the co n tra c tin g process to p ro c e e d in g o o d faith. In th e to u g h case in w hich th e p arties a re p o sited as p o te n tia l adversaries w hose interests a t least in p rin cip le m ig h t conflict, Rawlsian c o o p e ra tio n th ro u g h c o n tractin g relies o n th e p arties b ein g sufficiently sim ilar to u n d erw rite th e ir good faith in b o th th e b a rg ain in g process a n d th e a g re em en ts it achieves. If th e p arties a re p re su m e d to be m otivated by self-interest alo n e, th eir h o m o g en eity w ith each o th e r still can p ro m p t each to u n d e rsta n d the o th e rs in th e sam e term s each u n d e rsta n d s h im o r herself. T h e ir likeness to each o th e r can ex p lain how even th e m o st self-absorbed parties are a ttra c te d to a g reem en ts to act in concert. Even in th e absence o f otherre g a rd in g m otivation to c o n n e c t w ith each other, th e ir ho m o g en eity facilitates each p a rty 's n o t e n te rta in in g do u b ts a b o u t th e legitim acy o f th e o th ers (legitim ating o th ers very like o n e 's self is like legitim ating o n e 's own self), n o t im posing u n ilate ra l lim its o n exch an g in g ideas (th o se like o n e 's self likely have ideas o n e will like), a n d n o t h a rb o rin g reservations a b o u t th e value o f c o o p era tin g w ith th e oth ers (w orking to g e th e r w ith sim ilar p arties is like b ein g in th e com pany o f o n e 's own p ro d u ctiv e self). A ccepting oth ers as legitim ate, inviting th e ir ideas, a n d co m m ittin g to th e value o f jo in t e n terp rise a re expressions o f th e good faith n e e d e d to arrive a t a co n tra c t in adversarial b a rg a in in g . 15 A t least som e scholars c o n c e rn e d w ith ju stic e for n o n d o m in a n t social g ro u p s d e m u r fro m this p ictu re o f th e process fro m w h en ce ju stice com es, however. Given th e em phasis o n th e h o m o g en eity o f th e con tractin g parties, they object, social co n tra c t th eo ry c a n n o t h elp b u t be exclusionary a n d th ereb y likely to p ro m o te w hat fro m a n "o u tlie r" p er spective will seem unfair. G roups are "o u tliers" because they do n o t possess th e p ro p e rtie s p re su m e d essential fo r co n tra ctin g o r a t least do n o t possess som e o f th e m to a sufficient deg ree. T h e h o m o g en eity re q u ire m e n t m akes it difficult fo r such "o u tliers" to shap e a n d th e refo re to subscribe to th e p rin cip les th a t em erge fro m co n tractin g . T h e re q u ire m e n t invites d o u b ts a b o u t th e ir legitim acy as participants, deflect in g a tte n tio n fro m th e ir ideas a n d a tte n u a tin g th e value o f reach in g m u tu a l a g re e m e n t w ith th em . As a result, d o m in a n t insiders may engage w ith "o u tliers" in ways th a t violate g o o d faith. Yet it is precisely such "o u tliers"-p e o p le w ho are m o st vuln erab le because o f th e ir differ ences-w ho seem m o st to be in n e e d o f justice.
15.
A nn Knowles a n d Jam es Ritchie, "G ood Faith Bargaining in N orth America: R eport o f Study Tour to USA a n d Canada, 19 February-2 M arch 2001," http://w w w .businessnz .org.nz/doc/17/G oodF aithB argaininginN orthA m erica.
G ran ted th a tju stic e , as conceptualized by "in-groups" d eem ed qual ified for contracting, may be too narrow or restrictive to serve "out-groups" o r individual "outliers" e ith er fairly o r well. For exam ple, w om en an d racial m inorities historically have b e en defined as biologically defective a n d still suffer from th e social sequelae o f such disregard. Justice arrived a t th ro u g h "in-group" contracting may fail to reflect th e ir perspectives an d , consequently, m ay co n d o n e oppressive practices. P atem an a n d Mills m ake cases o f this sort, illustrating extensively how c u rre n t social arran g e m en ts em b ed g e n d e r a n d racial bias a t a level u n to u c h e d by th e usual workings o f ju stice because bias has to u c h ed ju stice itself. To P atem an a n d Mills, ju stice o perates as if people w ho have b e en historically m ar ginalized did n o t p articipate in agreeing to its principles. Historically, "outliers"-im agined to be u n p re p a re d o r otherw ise u n fit to succeed in contracting-have b e e n excluded a t the level o f principle from influ encing th e specification o f th e term s o f social cooperation. In th eir ab sence from th e conversation, term s inim ical to them , o r in convenient or ineffective for them , m ay have seem ed to o th e r peo p le to be com patible w ith justice.
F em inist a n d m in o rity-oriented scholarship readily identifies the social history th a t explains how likely this is to be so. In m any historical periods, th e ideas w ith w hich w om en o r racial m inorities find affinity w ere n o t respectfully w eighed. In su ch biased circum stances, th e n eeds a n d in terests o f w o m en a n d m inorities w ould n o t be re p re se n te d in collective reflectio n a b o u tju stice . T h e absence o f certain kinds o f p e o p le fro m th e process o f co n ceptualizing ju stic e m ay have c o n d e m n e d th em to suffer o n a practical level fro m ch ro n ic social a n d political disad vantage.
T h ese challenges to social co n tra c t th eo ry grow o u t o f a co m m o n place su p p o sitio n a b o u t how m u tu a l c o n sen t is achieved th ro u g h the fash io n in g o f contracts. Social co n tra ctin g is su p p o sed to p ro c e e d th ro u g h barg ain s stru ck by sim ilarly sm art, strong, a n d strategically m in d e d p arties w ith o n e an o th er. By collectively engaging in give-andtake to fin d a co m m o n core o f ag re em e n t, su ch individuals p ro d u c e ju stic e . N eg o tiatio n a m o n g equals results in a concep tu alizatio n o f ju s tice th a t p rom ises th e g reatest achievable p erso n a l advantage fo r each o f th e p arties co m p atib le w ith w hatever socially a n d self-im posed con straints th e o th e r p arties a cce p t.16
16.
This characterization is to be fo u n d in b oth contractarian a n d contractualist strands o f social contract theory. Contractarianism , identifying its origins in Hobbes, holds th a t rational assessment by itself shows th at m axim ization o f the jo in t interest o f parties engaging in m utual cooperation is the best strategy for achieving the self-interest o f the parties. C ontractualism begins with Kant a n d holds th at rationality also involves a nonstrategic respect for the parties o f social contract theory.
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Social c o n tra c t th e o ry m o d e le d o n b a rg ain in g th u s posits a n ide alized dynam ic a m o n g ag ents p u rsu in g individual interests in a c o n tex t in w hich n o n e initially is in a su p erio r o r in ferio r p o sitio n to anyone else. In these id eal circum stances, p e rso n al ad v an c em en t is b est assured by political a n d social policies acceptable to all alike. B ut c o n tractin g c a n n o t provide sim ilar security fo r p e o p le w ho have differences th a t d im in ish th e ir ch an ce o f a cc o m p lish m en t in b argaining. W h en con tractin g is e q u a te d w ith b argaining, th e disadvantage is to p eo p le whose o p p o rtu n itie s have b e e n tru n cate d . F or w h e th e r n a tu re o r social con v en tio n has lim ited th e ir o p p o rtu n ities, such individuals likely suffer fro m d im in ish ed capacity to p re s e n t o r p u rsu e th e ir interests effectively in th e give-and-take o f th e b arg ain in g process.
Som e such com p laints can fin d a ready answer. Social c o n tra ct th e o ry surely provides th a t in eq u ities w hose source lies in th e biases o f th e p ast can a n d sh o u ld b e rectified w h en it is n o t ratio n al to exclude th e ir victims. N o r is p ru d e n c e served by th e c o n tin u e d absence o f p e o p le w hose full in clu sio n as p arties to th e co n tra c t w ould b e n e fit b o th th e m selves a n d oth ers. As C u d d observes, o n th e assum ption th a t nonw hites a n d w o m en can b e n e fit a n d recip ro cate benefits, social c o n tra c t theory can show th e fu n d a m e n ta l irrationality o f contracts unresponsive to how in terests are in fle c te d by race o r sex.17
III. T H E DISABLED AS IRREDEEMABLE "O U TLIERS"
C u d d goes o n to posit, however, th a t n o t all "o u tliers" a re red e em a b le in this way. Rawls's a p p ro a c h reserves th e pow er to sh ape ju stic e to individuals w hose m e n ta l a n d physical abilities enab le th e m to partici p ate fully a n d equally in b arg ain in g a b o u t contractually cooperative schem es, w ith o u t o ffering any redem ptive m eans to p e rm it particip atio n by less able p e o p le .18 F or Rawls, "specifying th e term s o f social co o p T he fully cooperating assum ption has b een ignored by a n u m b er o f critics. For instance R onald Dworkin states th at the difference principle 'seems insufficiently sensitive to the position of those with natural handicaps, physical o r m ental, who do n o t themselves constitute a worst-off group, because this is defined economically, a n d would n o t c ount as the representative o r average m em ber o f any such gro u p .' This rem ark overlooks the fact that Rawls does n o t in ten d the difference principle to be sensitive era tio n b etw een citizens re g a rd e d as free a n d eq u al,"19 as h e also puts it, "m ean s th a t everyone has sufficient intellectu al pow ers to play a n o r m al p a rt in society a n d n o o n e suffers fro m u n u su al n e ed s th a t are especially difficult to fulfill, fo r exam ple, u n u su al a n d costly m edical re q u ire m e n ts. . . . A t this initial stage, th e fu n d a m e n ta l p ro b le m o f social ju stic e arises b etw een those w ho a re full a n d active a n d m orally conscien tio u s p articip an ts in society, a n d directly o r indirectly associated to g e th e r th ro u g h o u t a co m p lete life."20 Rawls p ro p o ses a n idealized a p p ro a c h to co n ceptualizing ju stice th a t considers "n o rm a l a n d fully c o o p era tin g m em b ers o f society over a co m p lete life."21 P eo p le w ho c a n n o t recip ro c ate benefits to o th ers fall b e y o n d th e scope o f ju stice . By so idealizing th e citizens w ho can be involved in specifying th e term s o f social co o p eratio n , Rawls ignores the perspectives o f anyone ju d g e d to be in capable o f c o n trib u tin g a t n o rm a l levels o r in sta n d a rd ways. A nd because these "o u tliers" a re n o t suffi ciently centrally p o sitio n e d to p re v e n t th e a d o p tio n o f practices th a t im pose d e trim e n ta l term s o r force th e m in to alien atin g roles, any social a n d p o litical p a rtic ip a tio n p e rm itte d to th em may b e n o m o re th a n a fo rm o f con sen su al su b o rd in atio n .
Rawlsian th eo ry consequently ap p ea rs to b an ish disabled people, w ho as a g ro u p a re believed u n ab le to engage w ith o th ers as th e bar g ain in g p a ra d ig m d em an d s a n d w ho individually som etim es really can n o t d o so, b ey o n d ju stic e . Social c o n tra c t th eo ry th a t is tied to a com petitive b a rg a in in g process in w hich p eo p le w ith disabilities ca n n o t succeed th u s casts th e m as a political underclass, to be g o v erned w ith o u t p rin c ip le d re g a rd fo r th e ir co n sen t o r th e ir interests. A n d as Kittay has p o in te d out, w hoever is closely associated w ith individuals assigned to a n u n d erclass-fo r exam ple, family caregivers-m ay be re le g ate d to the u n d erclass as well.22
In h e r T a n n e r lectures, N ussbaum offers th e m o st re c e n t a n d com p reh en siv e version o f this critique in a n exegesis o f social co n tra c t theory th a t lays b a re th e ro o ts o f th e "o u tlier p ro b le m ."23 She criticizes social c o n tra c t th e o ry fo r d enying physically a n d m entally disabled p ersons p a rtic ip a tio n in th e g ro u p o f those by w hom a n d fo r w hom political p rin cip les are chosen. A ccording to N ussbaum , those best served by the design o f p rin cip les o f ju stic e are those w ho have designed th em . B ut social c o n tra c t th e o ry 's d ev elopm ental ac c o u n t o f ju stic e denies access to th e disabled, sh e thinks, by invoking stan d ard s o f rationality, m oral capacity, a n d ability to co m m unicate, w hich m any disabled p eo p le can n o t satisfy, as co n d itio n s for p articip atin g in designing th e p rinciples o f ju stice.
O n N u ssb au m 's u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e process, social co n tractin g p resu p p o ses th a t ( 1 ) self-regarding, ra th e r th a n o th er-regarding, m o tivation is th e m o st plausible e x p lan a tio n a n d th e m o st co m pelling ju s tification for p e o p le 's giving over som e liberty a n d th a t ( 2 ) th e relevant self-regarding co n sid erations are those th a t guide rationally calculating individuals in sh a p in g m u tu ally a d v an tag eo u s ou tco m es. T h e re fo re , ( 3 ) political p rin cip les a n d practices c a n n o t h e lp b u t ( 3 a) be sh a p e d m ainly to th e in terests o f individuals capable o f re p re se n tin g them selves th ro u g h th e ra tio n a l calculation o f th e ir own interests a n d (3 b) privilege m ainly p e o p le w hose calculated co o p eratio n is believed to c o n trib u te to o th e r p e o p le 's advantage. S ta te m e n t 3a relates to th e design o f justice, th a t is, to th e for m u la tio n o f p rin cip les th a t d ire ct how p e o p le sh o u ld in teract. A design fo r ju stic e u n in fo rm e d by th e perspectives o f disabled p eo p le m ay resu lt in a ju stic e th a t leaves th e m out, ju s t as buildings th a t a re designed a b se n t co n su ltatio n w ith disabled p eo p le o ften lack accessible entran ces.24 S ta te m e n t 3 b relates to th e o p e ra tio n o f justice, th a t is, to the practices th ro u g h w hich p eo p le actually do in teract. O p eratio n s o f ju s 22. Kittay, Love's Labor. 23. We do n o t disagree with N ussbaum 's diagnosis o f the exclusionary nature ofsocial contract theory as she pictures it. But h e r picture reflects the narrowness o f the prevailing view of contracting. We urge instead a b ro ad er a n d rich er understanding o f the process o f contracting, one pro m p ted by N ussbaum 's insights about the im portance o f regard for others. By holding that contracting does not necessitate self-interested bargaining, we give other-regarding reasons a m uch wider scope in contracting th an does the prevailing narrow notion.
24. C urrent federal a n d state accessibility standards for building design were devel o p ed th ro u g h extensive consultation with disabled people.
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October 2005 tice th a t calculate how to realize m utually advantageous o u tcom es may dismiss p e o p le w hose c o n trib u tio n s to those outcom es a re co n sid ered nugatory. Similarly, a b u ild in g may be desig n ed accessibly b u t in op era tio n m ay tu rn o u t n o t to b e so. F or exam ple, once th e b u ild in g is in use, a side d o o r e n tra n c e id en tified o n b lu ep rin ts as a n en try for p e o p le w ho c a n n o t clim b stairs may b e k e p t locked to b e tte r co n tro l w hat is b ro u g h t in to o r tak en o u t o f th e building. A lth o u g h access for "o u tliers" w ho c a n n o t clim b stairs has b e e n in clu d ed in th e b u ild in g 's design, in o p e ra tio n a security issue takes p rec ed e n ce. I f 3 a in flu en ces th e design o f ju stice , th e n th e in terests o f p e o p le w ith in tellectu al disabilities o r o th e r lim itations th a t im p ed e th e ir re p re se n tin g them selves are less likely to be well served by th e fo rm ju stice takes th a n are th e in terests o f clever p eo p le. I f 3 b in flu en ces th e op e ra tio n o f ju stice, th e n im p le m e n tin g ju stic e will m arginalize all those p e o p le w hose biological im p a irm e n ts lim it how m u c h they can c o n trib u te to oth ers. A d em ocracy th a t a d o p ts 3 a will tre a t th e m inority o f p e o p le w ith in tellectu al disabilities badly, w hile a dem ocracy th a t ad opts 3 b will tre a t badly th e la rg e r m inority o f p eo p le w ho are perceived to have any disabling physical o r m e n ta l co n d itio n . O u r social a n d political history is re p le te w ith exam ples o f such b a d treatm en t.
N ussbaum id entifies prem ises 1 a n d 2 as sources o f th e defective th eo retical a n d p ractical conclusions th a t fail these groups. She offers th re e lines o f a rg u m e n t for h e r critiq u e: o n e draw n fro m th e history o f d isabled p eo p le, a n o th e r co n c ern in g th e re p re se n ta tio n o f disabled p eo p le, a n d a th ird a b o u t establishing m otivation fo r n o n d isab le d p e o p le to eng ag e w ith th e disabled.
IV. T H E H ISTO RY ARGUM ENT
N ussbaum situates h e r con cern s a b o u t th e logic o f c o n tra c t th eo ry in th e co n te x t o f its h istorical origins. C o n trac t th e o ry 's co n c ep tu a l dis re g a rd o f disability can be traced, she suggests, to social d isregard for disabled p e o p le in th e h istorical p e rio d w h en th in k in g o f ju stic e as the p ro d u c t o f a social co v enant began. She thinks th a t d u rin g th e initial d ev elo p m en t o f social c o n tra c t th eo ry "in th e sev en teen th a n d eight e e n th centuries, such p e o p le w ere sim ply n o t in c lu d e d in society. in o n e ear, was badly p o ck m ark ed , picked com pulsively a t his skin, suf fe re d fro m spasticity o r palsy a n d la te r in life fro m severe arthritis, a n d seem s som etim es to have b e e n so dep ressed as to rem ain b e d rid d e n .26 N evertheless, as literary scholar L e n n a rd Davis observes, "his co n te m p o raries re fe r to his disabilities only in a casual a n d literary m a n n e rte n d in g to see h im as a b rillian t m a n w ho h a d som e oddities ra th e r th a n a seriously disabled p e rso n ."27 In d e e d , biological states th a t since th e n in e te e n th cen tu ry have b e e n subjected to th e ra p e u tic in terv en tio n o r eu g en ic c o n tro l w ere in th e sev en teen th a n d e ig h te e n th centuries ac c e p ted as inescapable features o f ord in ary life. N u ssb au m 's d escrip tio n o f th e historical segregation o f disabled p e o p le th u s b e tte r reflects attitu d e s o f th e n in e te e n th century, w hen social status b ecam e biologized. C o n trary to h e r p ictu re o f th e era in w hich social c o n tra c t th e o ry was b o rn , individuals w ith econom ic, p o litical, o r social pow er co uld a n d d id h o ld sway in society despite overt infirm ities o f body o r m in d . Physical a n d m e n ta l deficits a n d d e terio ra tio n w ere n o t re g a rd e d as a b n o rm a l b u t as widely e n c o u n te re d ele m en ts o f th e course o f life.
N ussbaum h e rse lf n o tes H o b b e s's insistence th a t n a tu re m akes p e o p le eq u al in th e ways th a t p ro m o te m u tu al a g re em en t, even th o u g h they differ o n e fro m a n o th e r in stre n g th o f body o r m in d . She also cites R ou sseau 's p ro p o sal th a t w hat h u m a n s have in co m m o n a re th e ir weak nesses a n d vulnerabilities. B oth historical co n te x t a n d tex tu al evidence th u s suggest th at, as its o rig in ato rs u n d e rsto o d social co n tra c t theory, p e o p le w ith disabilities w ere n o t categorically p o sitio n ed b eyond its scope.
V. T H E REPRESENTATION ARGUM ENT
T h e core m o ral id e a in c o n tra c t th eo ry is resp e ct o f like p eo p le for each other, N ussbaum says. Specifically, w hoever c a n n o t re p re s e n t them selves in th e process will n o t b e re sp e cte d as parties to th e co n tract, as asserted in 3a above. P eo p le w ith som e kinds o f disabilities c a n n o t re p re se n t them selves in d elib eratio n s a b o u t th e design o f ju stic e. N ussbaum 's sec o n d a rg u m e n t th u s is th a t th e co n d itio n s o f co n trac tin g exclude those p e o p le w ith m e n ta l a n d physical disabilities w ho do n o t have the stre n g th o r skill to b argain. In response, N ussbaum suggests th a t co n tra c t th eo ry conflates b e in g th e subject o f ju stic e (th e cho o ser o f ju s t principles) w ith bein g the ob ject o f ju stic e (th e b eneficiary o f ju s t p rin cip le s).28 Especially p ro b lem atic for c o n tra c t th eo ry are p eo p le w ith w hat we m ig h t call re p re s e n ta tio n a l disabilities, im p airm en ts o f re aso n in g o r com m unicating, w ho are ru le d o u t as subjects o f ju stic e because they c a n n o t particip ate successfully in th e co n tra ctin g process. If ju s tic e 's objects m u st also be its subjects, N ussbaum co n ten d s, c o n tra c t th eo ry m istakenly also d e prives these individuals o f b ein g objects o f justice.
O n e resp o n se w ould be th a t all m o ral subjects a re parties to the c o n tra c t b u t th a t trustees can choose for p eo p le w ith re p re se n ta tio n al disabilities. In so choosing, trustees sh o u ld be g u id e d only by th e in terests o f th o se they re p re se n t. B ut N ussbaum dismisses tru steeship as a so lu tio n to th e p ro b le m o f re p re se n ta tio n al disabilities in th e process o f social c o n tra c tin g .29 A lth o u g h tru steesh ip is a co m m o n legal practice, N ussbaum fears th a t in a process o f b a rg a in in g to a social c o n tra ct trustees co u ld n o t h e lp b u t re p re s e n t th e ir own interests ra th e r th a n th e in terests o f th e b eneficiaries o f th e tru st relatio n sh ip .
It is easy to see how N u ssb au m 's co n cern s a b o u t tru steesh ip arise. F or trustees o r o th e r stand-ins are parties to th e c o n tra c t a n d th ere fo re w ould be b a rg ain in g in th e ir own rig h t as well. T h e re w ould b e conflicts o f in te re st-th e ir own in terests against th e in terests o f those w hom they re p re se n t. T h e safeg u ard o f selecting th e m as decision m akers because they take a n in te re st in th e ir beneficiaries, as well as because they are in a n epistem ologically favorable position, could fall prey to su ch con flict. W orse still, if th e re is n o in d e p e n d e n t way o f u n d e rsta n d in g w hat th e in terests o f th e b eneficiaries are, th e re is n o way o f ju d g in g w h eth e r th e conflict has c o rru p te d th e co n tra ctin g process. We ag ree w ith Nussb a u m th a t this fear is fu n d a m en ta l. For N ussbaum , however, assuaging it necessitates a so lu tio n th a t goes b eyond social co n tra c t theory.
N ussbaum tu rn s to capabilities as a substantive alternative to the pro ced u ralism o f traditional social co n tract theory. H e r capabilities theory specifies w hat goods are fu n d am en tal to all h u m a n s' interests a n d thus are core h u m a n entitlem ents th a t a ju s t society has an overriding obli gatio n to honor. To give substance a n d direction to fulfilling entitlem ents to capabilities, N ussbaum "adopts the idea o f a threshold level of each ca pability b e n e a th w hich it is h e ld th a t truly h u m a n fu n ctioning is n o t avail 
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October 2005 able to citizens."30 R ath er th a n being c o n te n t w ith co n tract th eo ry 's faith th a t th e p ro ced u res for ju stice will "gen erate a n adequately ju s t outcom e,"31 she directly designates good outcom es, u n d ersto o d in term s o f th resh o ld levels o f capabilities. N ussbaum 's capabilities ap p ro ac h distrib utes abilities th a t enable individuals to convert resources in to the func tionings th a t are o f central im p o rtan ce for th e ir flourishing.32 Som e individuals m ay n e e d m o re resources th a n oth ers to achieve ro u g h ly eq u iv alen t functionings, however. S om eone w ho c a n n o t use h e r legs may n e e d m o re reso urces th a n som eo n e w ho can walk to enable mobility. She m ay n e e d expensive m edical in te rv e n tio n to resto re leg fu n ctio n . O r she m ay n e e d a w heelch air a n d specially e q u ip p e d van to travel fro m h o m e to w ork, w hile m o st p eo p le use com m only available form s o f p u b lic tran sp o rtatio n .
O n th e capabilities a p p ro ac h , society's o b ligation to achieve these goods reach es to p eo p le u n a b le to b e parties to a co n tra c t o r otherw ise re p re s e n t them selves effectively. Yet this id e a m ay n o t be as g en ero u s as h o p e d to p e o p le w ith disabilities. T h e capabilities a p p ro a c h advocates a lte rin g p eo p le by allocating resources sufficient to com p en sate for def icits a n d to rise to th e m inim al stan d ard o f necessary capability o r at least to achieve th e g reatest capability possible if they c a n n o t rise to th a t stan d ard . This goal can ex tract h ig h costs fro m recip ien ts who otherw ise m ig h t seem to b e its beneficiaries.
In p rin cip le, o f course, p eo p le are free to have capabilities th a t m e e t th e sta n d a rd for th e species w ith o u t exercising th em . N evertheless, settin g th resh o ld s for capabilities enco u rag es oppressively ju d g m e n ta l practices. First, those w ho irrem ediably fall sh o rt o f sta n d a rd (n o rm a l) capabilities are rip e fo r stigm atization. In practice a capabilities ap p ro a c h th a t values m e e tin g th re sh o ld stan d ard s c a n n o t also rem ain pos itive o r even n e u tra l a b o u t w hoever c a n n o t be b ro u g h t u p to these stan d ard s. S econd, how ever g en ero u s society m ay be in allocating re sources so th a t p e o p le d eficien t in capabilities can acq u ire th em , recip ien ts o fte n m u st pay th e ir sh are w ith h a rd w ork o r p a in for th e acqui sition. B oth these co n sid erations are dan g ers a n assim ilation strategy 30. Nussbaum, "Beyond the Social C ontract," lecture 1, 26. 31. Ibid., 33. 32. Nussbaum explains the difference betw een capabilities a n d functioning as follows: "Sen also insists however, th at the n e ed to focus on capability becom es especially clear w hen we consider cases in which individuals are h a m p e red in various atypical ways in their attem pts to tu rn resources into actual functioning. A person in a wheel chair, for exam ple, needs m ore resources th an does a person who can walk, in ord er to get from place to place. Similarly, a culture that traditionally discourages wom en from becom ing educated will n e ed to devote m ore resources to fem ale literacy th an to m ale literacy. T herefore the really revealing thing to look at, the real m easure of social position, is each individual's actual capability to function in a variety o f areas." Ibid., lecture 2, 43.
poses for individuals w ho c a n n o t be assim ilated o r for w hom assim ilation is excessively stren u o u s.
N u ssb au m 's w arn in g against "seg m en tin g o ff th e disabled as if they b e lo n g e d to a d iffe re n t (a n d low er) k in d " initially m ay m itigate these fears.33 B ut she so elo q u ently portrays core capabilities as crucial to h u m a n dignity th
a n b e in g to b e able to fu n c tio n in these ways."35 A n u n fo rtu n a te , b u t all to o fam iliar, corollary is th a t a d e c e n t society also grieves for individuals w ho c a n n o t be b ro u g h t u p to level a n d reg rets th e p e o p le they can n ev er be ra th e r th a n accep tin g th e m as th e p erso n s they are. F urther, history shows th a t b ein g d esignated as a tragic sufferer, a n d th ereb y as b u rd e n so m e to self a n d others, m akes disabled p eo p le vu ln erab le to social d isa p p ro b a tio n a n d h a rm .36 N ussbaum h e rse lf does n o t go dow n this ro ad , b u t a capabilities a c c o u n t could facilitate those w ho w ould.
N ussbaum advises us to "keep th e species n o rm fully in view" in d irectin g distributive policy.37 She sets ou tco m e stan d ard s fo r necessary capabilities in o rd e r to create guidelines a n d obligations fo r d istributing benefits: individuals w ho suffer fro m deficits a re ow ed b ein g b ro u g h t u p to th e capabilities th re sh o ld dictated by th e species n o rm . So, on h e r capabilities a p p ro a c h , ju s t tre a tm e n t o f th e disabled seem s to m ean p erm ittin g , en co u rag in g , o r obligating th e n o n d isab led to relate to the disabled prim arily by im proving th em , w h e th e r o r n o t they can be im p ro v ed a n d w h e th e r o r n o t they p re fe r to be im proved. T his a p p ro a c h is h azard o u s for disabled p eo p le because it privileges th e no rm al. Cer tainly elevating all citizens to a m inim ally a d e q u a te capability level is a very w orthy am b itio n . B u t to m ake achieving such a n o u tco m e th e goal o f ju stic e revives risks to disabled p e o p le 's status th a t in N u ssb au m 's view m a r social c o n tra c t theory.
F or exam ple, a society th a t m easures ju stn e ss in term s o f th e re 33. Ibid., 54. 34. In a later version (in the possession of one o f the authors) Nussbaum no longer characterizes the lives of individuals for whom the developm ent o f capabilities to the level o f the species no rm is impossible as tragedies. But she does n o t abandon h e r initial evaluation. She describes th eir lives as u nfortunate a n d as causing sadness in the lives of their caregivers.
35. Nussbaum, "Beyond the Social C ontract," lecture 2, 56. 36. T he Nazi euthanasia program was fueled by characterizing the lives of disabled people as burdensom e to themselves, their families, a n d society.
37. Nussbaum, "Beyond the Social C ontract," lecture 2, 56.
a n n o t h e lp b u t a p p e a r inflexible a n d constrictive fro m a disability p erspective.40 N or is it a p p a re n t th a t o th e r attem p ts to con s tru c t a substantive id ea o f a g u iding g o o d w ith o u t full p a rtic ip a tio n by disabled p e o p le w ould b e tte r reflec t th e ir realities a n d p references.
W h e th e r a ju stic e th e o ry 's em phasis is p ro c e d u ra l o r substantive, th e re fo re , th e q u estio n o f p articip ato ry roles fo r disabled p eo p le re m ains. T h e p ro b le m is e x acerb ated by th e successful b a rg a in e r p a ra digm . F or th e re to be a bargain, th e re m u st b e parties to it, a n d these p arties m u st re p re s e n t them selves o r be re p re se n te d . If p articip atio n m ean s having a ro le in bargaining, th e difficult issue o f re p re se n ta tio n by a tru stee recurs. Som e disabled p e o p le c a n n o t re p re s e n t them selves a n d th e re fo re in p rin cip le w ould re q u ire re p re se n ta tio n . A n d practical co n cern s m ay suggest th a t o th e r disabled peo p le, able to re p re se n t them selves b u t only awkwardly a n d a t a social cost o f discom fiting n o n disabled p eo p le, sh o u ld be b ro u g h t u n d e r tru steesh ip so th a t n eg o tia tions m ay p ro c e e d sm oothly. P articip atio n th ro u g h a tru stee is, however, by proxy a n d th ere fo re figurative only. In effect, tru steesh ip m ig h t p re v e n t disabled p e o p le 's 
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trib u tio n s fro m oth ers th a n they can recip ro cate, w hile som e c a n n o t rec ip ro cate directly at all.
R eciprocity o f benefits en ters social co n tra ctin g as a n ex p lan atio n o f why co n tracto rs seek to co-associate. A stan d in g criticism o f social co n tra c t theory, e c h o e d by N ussbaum , is th a t th e co n tra ctin g choosers a re envisioned as egoists. O f course, in real life we are n o t all egoists, o r a t least n o t all egoists always. M any o f us are c o m m itted to th e good o f o th ers o r to ideals th a t a re n o t re la te d in any obvious way solely to o u r own interests. I f th e parties in th e b arg ain in g process m ake choices solely to fu rth e r th e ir own self-interest, so th e criticism goes, otherre g a rd in g values will be u n d e rre p re s e n te d in o u r social co m p act a n d th e p rin cip les th a t reg u late its im p lem en tatio n .
A lth o u g h a stock criticism o f c o n tra c t theory, this hits its targ e t only if all versions o f th e th eo ry assum e w h at m ig h t be called th e egoist a c c o u n t o f co n tracto rs p u rsu in g th e ir narrow ly d efin ed self-interest. O n o th e r versions, however, con tracto rs are seen as trying to m axim ize w hat ever is im p o rta n t to th em . To b e sure, w h at is im p o rta n t m ig h t be w hat fu rth e rs th e ir own n arro w benefit. B ut it m ig h t n o t be, for they are trying to d o w hat they see as best by th e ir own lights.
C en tral to th e g e n e ral p o in t o f co n tra c t th eo ry is th a t w hen each party is p o sitio n e d as a chooser, each also stands as a c en tral source o f th e ju stific a tio n o f political claim s a n d th e m otivation to com ply with th em . Giving a n a c c o u n t o f why choosers m ake (o r sh o u ld m ake) th eir selections is a cen tral p ro b le m fo r c o n tra c t theory. O n th e o n e h a n d , th e re is th e H o b b esian assu m p tio n th a t all are v u ln erab le to th e d e p 41 .
This problem has its analogue in the developm ent o f labor unions. It surfaces when u nion officials, who represent the unio n d uring bargaining, have n o t com e u p from being rank a n d file workers a n d therefore do not un d erstan d working conditions in the same way.
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October 2005 re d a tio n s o f o th e rs a n d so are m utually subscribed to provisions for security as th e collective goal o f contracting. T h e Rawlsian assum ption, o n th e o th e r h a n d , takes m utually accep tab le p rinciples fo r th e distri b u tio n o f th e ben efits a n d b u rd e n s o f social co o p e ra tio n as th e p a ra m o u n t goal. C o m m o n to these read in g s is th e n o tio n th a t parties to the co n tra c t directly b e n e fit each o th e r th ro u g h political association.42 N ussbaum objects th a t "o u tliers" a n d d e p e n d e n ts-such as disabled p e o p le usually a re th o u g h t to b e-c a n n o t rise to th e level o f full b e n eficiaries as specified by c o n tra c t th eo ry because they are, a t best, lim ited co n trib u to rs. O n a p ractical level she will be rig h t if th e core id e a o f co n tra c t th eo ry is recip ro cal b e n e fit betw een p eo p le w ho live together. Som e disabled p e o p le are globally d e p e n d e n t o n others. Som e are barely ab le to care fo r them selves, let alo n e fo r others. A t th e very least, being disabled is u n d e rsto o d to m e a n th a t p eo p le m u st rely m o re th a n usual o n o th e r individuals in o n e o r m o re aspects o f th e ir lives.
Rawls's response is th a t people w ho are so d e p e n d e n t, w h eth er be cause o f physical o r because o f m ental disabilities, a re n o t subjects o f justice. N ussbaum rightly objects to this dismissal a n d th e n bro ad en s the criticism, saying th a t th e theory has n o place for peo p le who, for long stretches o r even th e ir w hole life, are m arkedly u n e q u al in productivity o r w ho live in conditions o f asym m etrical dependency.43 B ut this critique assum es a version o f co n tract theory flawed by features th a t a re n o t es sential to th e contractin g process. T he m o d el against w hich the criticisms are d irected ignores crucial dim ensions o f how individuals contracting w ith o n e a n o th e r m utually relate. T h e m odel goes astray in these respects because it is cen te re d o n th e successful barg ain er paradigm .
VII. CO N TRA CTIN G W ITH TRU ST
M ust co n tra c tin g be re d u c e d to e ith e r individual o r collective b arg ain ing? If social co n tra c tin g in stead is u n d e rsto o d along th e lines we will suggest, th e im p o rta n c e o f re p re se n ta tio n , a n d especially self-represen tation, fo r eliciting re sp e c t fro m o th e rs d u rin g th e process dim inishes. So th e w orry a b o u t ig n o rin g p e o p le w ith re p re se n ta tio n al disabilities recedes. N o r n e e d th e basic relatio n sh ip a m o n g th e parties be co n stru e d as a process o f n e g o tia tin g recip ro cal benefits a m o n g those w ho are able to bestow them .
A n alternative way to construe this relationship acknow ledges a n d even fo reg ro u n d s th e h u m a n conditions o f vulnerability a n d d ep e n d en c e while preserving th e id ea th a t im p o rta n t m oral a n d political relationships betw een p eo p le are illu m inated by the contracting m odel. U nd erstan d in g contractin g n o t in term s o f peo p le jockeying for position against one a n o th e r b u t in term s o f p eo p le developing bonds o f confidence with each o th e r dissipates th e challenges m ade to social co n tract theory o n b eh a lf o f disabled "outliers." O n th e latter in terp retatio n , w hich we develop here, social con tractin g helps m ap understan d in g s (typically b u t n o t necessarily articulated as a set o f principles) th a t facilitate p arties' awareness o f each o th e r's expectations a b o u t how each will behave. Such m u tu al com pre h en sio n can be in d u c e d by sh ared feelings o r by co m m on reasons. I t can be forged w ith o u t being negotiated.
T h e fam iliar c o n te m p o ra ry re a d in g o f social c o n tra c t th eo ry is th a t a process in w hich th e g o v ern ed b arg ain w ith each o th e r is necessary to secu rin g c o n se n t to be g o v erned a n d con fid en ce in th e system. B ut b a rg ain in g is by n a tu re adversarial,44 so only those w ho can take p a rt in strategic give-and-take betw een adversaries qualify fo r roles in b u ild in g co n sen t. O nly those w ho take p a rt can be assum ed to subscribe to th e m u tu a l co n cep tu alizatio n o f ju stic e th a t results fro m th e co n tractin g process. F urther, only th o se w ho can give so m eth in g w orthw hile to o th ers will deserve o th e rs reciprocally giving over to th em . F rom such con sid eratio n s com es th e view th a t only those w ho particip ate by reciprocally co n trib u tin g can b e subjects o f ju stice.
O n this in te rp re ta tio n , th re sh o ld levels o f ability to p re se n t o n e 's view point, to strategize against o th e rs so as to p ro m o te o n e 's view point, a n d to co n trib u te to o th e rs so they value o n e 's view point are re q u ire d fo r successful p a rtic ip a tio n in social co n tractin g . T his is how th e re q uisite re p re se n ta tio n a n d rec ip ro catio n capacities seem to be u n d e r stood, for exam ple, in Rawlsian versions o f co n tra c t theory.45 As we have seen, th e perspectives o f th e disabled a n d o th ers w ho have difficulty m e e tin g these co n d itio n s m ay be d o o m e d to in elu ctab le d isregard by social c o n tra c t th e o ry so u n d e rsto o d , as well as by political systems th a t thusly in te rp re t th e theory.
Som e co m m en tato rs-B ecker a n d R eath, fo r exam ple-believe the p ro b le m is su rm o u n ta b le because ra tio n al self-interested parties e n gag ed in b a rg a in in g will provide fo r con tin g en cies in w hich they th e m 
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selves, o r p e o p le w ith w hom they have affectional ties, a re disabled.46 U n doubtedly, p ru d e n c e may d ec ree this result. N evertheless, N ussbaum presses a n im p o rta n t p o in t against this defense o f co n tractin g . She thinks th a t a d e q u a te reassu ran ce a b o u t vuln erab le individuals being em b ra c e d by ju stic e d em an d s th a t oth er-reg ard in g , ra th e r th a n selfreg ard in g , reasons prevail. Too m u c h uncertainty, she po in ts out, atten d s w h e th e r th e p arsim o n io u s startin g p o in t o f self-regard "will even lead in th e sam e d ire c tio n as a m o re sym pathetic a n d other-involved starting p o in t. N o r is it clear w h e th e r th e ra b b it o f ju stice can really b e p u lled o u t o f th e h a t o f ra tio n a l self-interest."47 Social c o n tra c t th e o ry aim s fu n d am en tally a t a n ac c o u n t o f how social co o p e ra tio n (far m o re th a n sim ply sh a rin g resources) ju stly may be su stained. In this light, it seem s c o u n terp ro d u ctiv e to co n stru e the fo u n d a tio n a l co n tra c tin g process as essentially adversarial. To th e con trary, th e benefits o f m u tu a l a g re e m e n t are m u c h b e tte r achieved by p ro m o tin g stable co m p liance w ith m u tu al ex p ectations.48 So a fo u n d atio n al process th a t disposes p articip an ts to be co n sta n t seem s m o re effective fo r stabilizing co o p eratio n th a n a process in w hich th e parties re m a in m otivated n o t to com ply w hen they can disadvantage o th e r par ties w ith o u t h a rm in g them selves. 49 To be sure, th e assum ption th at the contracting process m u st be conflictual seem s plausible o n egoist assum ptions ab o u t the parties an d th e ir interests. But, as already indicated, co n tract theory is n o t w edded to assum ptions o f selfishness a n d is 49. See Je a n H am pton, Political Philosophy (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998). In "The Sense o f Justice," Rawls identifies this problem as a m a in source o f instability for cooperative schemes, but his rem edy is to invoke a psychological account o n which feelings o f "as sociation guilt" are supposed to motivate com pliance. Rawls does believe, however, th at the culture created by a cooperative schem e may "generate . . . inclinations th at furth er support it," an observation that points in the direction o f the approach we are urging (Philosophical Review 72 [1963] : 281-305, 290-91).
50. We note here B ecker's "tough crowd" argum ent in his com m entary o n Nussbaum, previously cited. Even if willing to deal with each other, people may have irreconcilable views about hu m an good a n d the good life. Becker, "Social C ontract T heory a n d the Tough-Crowd Problem ," observes th at rational self-interest is the m ost inclusive piece of com m on ground, capable o f generating stable political arrangem ents. A sim ilar point is m ade by Becker in "Reciprocity, Justice, a n d Disability," in this issue (13).
Even those versions o f co n tract theory m ost parsim onious a b o u t attrib u tin g m otivation p resu m e th a t peo p le are capable o f being sufficiently other-regarding to b in d them selves to one a n o th e r in relationships with b o th contractu al a n d fiduciary force.51 Rawls him self, in early writing, regards th e w orkings o f affectional attitudes a n d capacities such as trust, expressed th ro u g h o ther-regarding reasons for acting, as a basic p re su m p tio n o f ju stice a n d as fu n d am en tal to "the n o tio n o f hum anity."52
As F ukuyam a observes, p e o p le w ho do n o t tru st each o th e r can co o p e ra te only u n d e r rules th a t m u st be n eg o tiated , a g re ed to, a n d en fo rced . T his legal a p p a ratu s im poses tran sactio n costs, Fukuyam a re m in d s us.53 T rust-en h an cing systems can be m o re flexible a n d responsive to individualized situations th a n ru le -en fo rcem en t systems are, a n d they do n o t im pose o p e ra tio n a l costs o n particip an ts in th e sam e way. Al th o u g h c o n tractin g som etim es is th o u g h t o f as a n in stru m e n t o f au thority, th e practice w ould n o t survive in a u th o rita ria n systems w ith o u t ro o m for th e p arties to exercise th e free m u tu al a g re e m e n t th a t is char acteristic o f contractin g .
E ntry in to co n tracts m ay b e th o u g h t o f as m o re protective th a n relian ce o n trust, b u t closer a tte n tio n to p ractice reveals m u c h m o re n u a n c e d facts. C o n tractin g som etim es is erro n eo u sly th o u g h t to be itself a n e n fo rc e m e n t m ech an ism . To th e contrary, co n tra ctin g is a process w ith a n execu tab le p ro d u c t th a t parties m ay n o t always n e e d en fo rce m e n t to secure. C onventions, covenants, com pacts, a n d contracts are outco m es o f processes o f developing trust. O n c e forged, they in tu rn fu rth e r b u ttress trust. Such in stru m en ts cultivate a cu ltu re o f tru st by s tre n g th e n in g th e d eg ree to w hich it is co n ventional to tre a t oth ers fairly.54 Lack o f trust, however, p ro m p ts disruptive feedback in th e form 51. For the claim th at a relationship cannot be b oth fiduciary a n d contractual, see M argaret M. Blair a n d Lynn A. Stout, "Trust, Trustworthiness, a n d the Behavioral o f su sp icio n -g en erated p ractice th a t inflates th e cost o f trust, in clu d in g th e tru st th a t initially com es in to play w hen we are a b o u t to e n te r in to c o n tractu al relatio n s w ith others. C onventions, covenants, com pacts, a n d co n tracts also facilitate a clim ate o f tru st by stre n g th e n in g com m itm e n t to th e system. T h e m o re trust-facilitating th e cu ltu re a n d the clim ate, th e less n e e d for e n fo rc e m e n t to be th e a fterm ath o f co n tractin g a n d th e low er th e tran sactio n costs o f contracting. So o u r m aking (im p e rfe c t) provision to en fo rce contracts in case tru st is betrayed by n o m ean s proves us to be so fundam entally, endem ically, a n d inescapably suspicious as to m ake e n fo rc e m e n t th e reaso n fo r co n tractin g .55 To trust, B aier says, is to accep t "vulnerability to a n o th e r p e rs o n 's pow er over so m eth in g o n e cares ab o u t, in th e con fid en ce th a t such pow er will n o t be u sed to h a rm w hat is e n tru ste d ."56 C oncom itantly, B aier advises, th e e n tru ste d sh o u ld selectively disem pow er them selves so as to invite a n d n o t abuse co n fid en c e.57 B aier rem in d s us th a t the h a n d sh ak e, th e signal th a t th e m utuality o f a contract-like a g re e m e n t has b e e n re a c h e d , o rig in ated fro m individuals' disem pow ering th e m selves by m utually placin g th e ir w eapon-w ielding h a n d s w ithin th e con tro l o f th e o th e r party.58 F rom th e h an d sh a k e to th e treaty, we have m any ways o f signifying th a t a co m p act has b e e n rea ch e d . Som e m eth o d s describe th e ex p e c te d outcom es in g rea te r detail a n d th e re fo re are b e tte r guides fo r fulfilling expectations. B ut form al d o c u m en ts th a t as sign pow ers a n d p e rfo rm a n ces to each party by n o m eans ex h au st the expressio n o f such agreem ents.
H a rd in co m m en ts th a t "th e legal system o f c o n tra c t e n fo rc e m e n t enables m e to tru st you in som e form al ex ch an g e."59 B ut this way o f loo k in g a t co n tra c tin g m ay p u t th e cart befo re th e h o rse. C ontracts are in stru m e n ts ra th e r th a n causes o f trust. We do n o t seek o u t those w hom we distrust in o rd e r to m ake contracts. To th e contrary, d istru st is a re a so n to avoid e n te rin g co n tractu al relationships. I t seem s m o re ap p ro p ria te to say th a t tru stin g you enco u rag es m e to c o n tra c t w ith you (p e rh a p s w ith only a h a n d sh a k e ), a n d th a t th e legal system o f c o n tra ct e n fo rc e m e n t m itigates th e costs o f m isplaced trust. Legal c o n tra c t e n fo rc e m e n t th u s m ay facilitate b ein g generally a tru stin g ra th e r th a n a suggested that the afterm ath of the long history o f unfairness to wom en shows how robust the crucial link betw een trust and fairness is. For, as th eir analyses of practices pertaining to g endered roles has revealed these to be unfair, wom en have withdrawn th eir trust in those who are advantaged by such arrangem ents.
55. See nn. 12 a n d 13 above for the difference betw een a culture o f trust a n d a climate o f trust.
56 suspicious p erso n , b u t specifically it is a t least som e deg ree o f tru st th a t u n d erw rites e n te rin g a co n trac tu al a rra n g e m e n t in th e first place. C o n tractin g does call u p o n th e parties to exercise g o o d faith. G ood faith is im p o rta n t because n o co n tra c t can ex tract exact a g re e m e n t a b o u t w hat com p lian ce will re q u ire in every circum stance. T rust sustains th e p a rtie s' g o o d faith efforts in u n fo re se e n situations, even betw een very d iffe re n t sorts o f individuals. As B ukspan writes, "T h e legal system will th ereb y p ro m o te a cu ltu re o f tru st in th e co n te x t o f c o n tra c t law th a t will e n c o u ra g e ease, increase safety a n d con fid en ce levels, a n d im prove p la n n in g ability a t th e level o f in te ra c tio n a n d c o m m itm en t."60 T h a t co n tra c tin g is p racticed in everyday com m ercial a n d civic life ev id en ces o u r capacity to forge a cultu re a n d foster a clim ate o f tru st.61 E lim in atin g social practices th a t e n d a n g e r o r e ro d e trust, su ch as th e exploitative ones o f w hich Mills a n d P ate m an com plain, is called fo r in p rin cip le o n a co n cep tu alizatio n th a t treats tru st as a fo u n d atio n a l e le m e n t fo r th e d e v e lo p m en t o f a system o f ju stic e. In this reg ard , F ou cau lt insists th a t th e re can be n o tru st in exploitative societies.62 T rust invoked to g ro u n d o r e n ab le exploitative ag ree m en ts m eans tru st di m in ish ed . In p rin cip le, th erefo re, tru sting co n tracto rs sh o u ld b e a t least as c o n c e rn e d a b o u t e x p lo itatio n as b a rg ain in g con tracto rs are, a lth o u g h they m ay be less fo cused o n p ro te c tin g them selves a n d m o re o n g u a rd in g others. P a te m a n a n d Mills, w ho see th e b a rg ain in g m o d e l o f social con tractin g as biased, p o rtray this p ro c e d u re as com plicit in social injustice th a t extinguishes its victim s' trust. N evertheless, o th ers co n sid er the p ro c e d u re o f b a rg ain in g a m o n g equals to be a p latfo rm fro m w hich c o n d e m n a tio n o f e x p lo itatio n can b e la u n c h e d .63 T h e b arg a in in g m odel supposes th a t a g reem en ts betw een equals definitively b ar ex p loitation o f p arties by each other. Equals are p re su m e d u n ab le to im pose ex ploitative term s o n each oth er: equally stro n g parties ostensibly ca n n o t b arg ain a n a g re e m e n t w here som e take advantage o f others. F urther, p arties w ho a re equally ig n o ra n t o f w hich a m o n g th e m will be stro n g 60. Eli Bukspan, "T he N otion o f Trust as a Com prehensive T heory of Contract and C orporate Law: A New A pproach to the C onception T hat the C orporation Is a Nexus of C ontract," George W ashington Law School, Public Law a n d Legal T heory Research Paper no. 53, 12-13. Published o n the Social Science Research Network E lectronic Paper Col lection, h ttp ://s srn .c o m /a n stra c t_ id p 3 6 3 4 4 0 .
61. Kimel, From Promise to Contract, argues th a t there is an im portant difference between trust th a t pertains to promises, which "flows from a certain favorable perception of the prom isor's personality" (19) a n d im personal trust th a t can h old betw een strangers (58-60). 63. We are grateful to anonym ous reviewers for pressing this concern.
a re p re su m e d to b arg ain so th e initial a g re e m e n t pro tects ag ain st being ex p lo ited in case they tu rn o u t to b e to o w eak to p ro te c t them selves.64 In contrast, p arties w hose a g re e m e n t em erges fro m tru stin g each o th e r r a th e r th a n b a rg a in in g ag ainst o n e a n o th e r m ay seem less likely to fash io n a g re e m e n ts cast in such self-protective term s. A greem ents issuing fro m tru st th e re fo re m ay be feared to perm it, o r even enable, ex p lo itatio n o f th e w eak by th e stro n g or, m o re precisely, o f th e trusting by th e duplicitous. O f course, tru st by itself is unlikely to p ro m p t a party to em b race an a g re e m e n t th a t she sees only as h a rm in g h erself.65 For such a featu re w ould co n travene a necessary e le m e n t o f h e r trusting, namely, th a t th e a rra n g e m e n t co n trib u tes directly o r indirectly to som e th in g she cares a b o u t sufficiently to associate w ith h e r w elfare.66 W h ere she trusts th e o th e r parties as p a rtn e rs r a th e r th a n bargains ag ain st th e m as adversaries, however, she m ig h t n o t press fo r optim al o r eq u al b e n e fit fo r herself. B ecause she relies o n th e ir c o n c e rn for w hat she cares ab o u t, she m ig h t a c ce p t b e in g a m ean s to th e o th e r p a rtie s' en d s w ith o u t fin d in g th e a rra n g e m e n t u n fair o r feeling ex p lo ited . T h e process o f reac h in g cooperative a g re em e n ts th ro u g h the cultivation o f tru st th u s may a p p e a r to perm it, o r even to g ro u n d , ex ploitative arra n g e m en ts, as adversarial b a rg a in in g is th o u g h t n o t to do.
Yet o n ce a tte n tio n is d ire cte d bey o n d b arg ain in g betw een h o m o g en eo u s p arties to th e n e e d fo r very d iffe re n t kinds o f p eo p le to agree, th e situ atio n ap p e a rs m o re n u a n c e d a n d th e b a rg ain in g m o d el less effective. T h e re is a n in h e re n t lim itatio n in th e b arg ain in g m o d e l's ability to ad d ress ex p lo itation, for th e integrity o f th e process w hereby b a rg ain in g ag en ts com e to a g re e m e n t a b o u t term s d ep en d s o n th e p ro b lem o f vulnerability n o t arising. All choosers a re so sim ilar th a t n o n e has a th re a t advantage, so th e re may ap p e a r to be n o risk o f any im posing term s perm issive o f e x p lo itatio n o n th e others. B ut w ith o u t ad d itio n a l prem ises this a p p e a ra n c e is m isleading.67 S uppose these p arties e x p ect to be in a real w orld w here som e are sufficiently p ow erful to ex p lo it w hile o th e rs a re vuln erab le e n o u g h to be ex ploited. T h e b a rg a in in g p ro c e d u re c a n n o t p re su m e th e parties to 64 . See Lawrence Becker, "Reciprocity, Justice, a n d Disability," in this issue, for an excellent exploration o f this argum ent.
65. Being trustful may m ake h e r less suspicious o f false claims th a t the arrangem ent is good for her, but here h e r m istaken beliefs, not h e r trust, p rom pt h e r agreem ent.
66. See Baier, "Trusting People." 67. Brian Barry m akes the point that fu rth er prem ises are necessary to determ ine the choices o f ideally rational choosers: "O f course, it is open to anyone to object that we do n o t get fairness by asking what ideally rational actors w ould finish up with if they bargained with each other. But it is n o t even w orth asking that question unless we think it makes sense to produce a form ula a n d say th at this tells us what ideally rational bargainers would finish u p with in any given situation," Theories ofJustice, 11. uniform ly p re fe r p rin cip les for p ro te c tin g them selves in case they are v u ln erab le over perm issive p rinciples th a t advantage th e m sh o u ld they be strong. T h e b a rg ain in g a m o n g equals m o d e l thus ap p ears to n e e d a n a d d itio n a l c riterio n -g en eratin g p rem ise-th a t th e parties to the a g re e m e n t are n o t risk takers b u t are risk aversive-to g e n e rate p rin ciples c o n d e m n a to ry o f exploitation.
A g e n e ra l m eth o d o lo g ical issue is in play h e re .68 Rawlsian social co n tra c t th eo ries aim a t a purely p ro c ed u ralist g ro u n d in g for ju stic e .69 T hey c o n stru c t a p ro c e d u re -co n tra ctin g -a n d co nsider w h at p rin ci ples o f ju stic e th a t p ro c e d u re w ould g en erate. Ju stificatio n is q u estion b eg g in g if it tests th e p ro c e d u re in term s o f prin cip les o f ju stic e th a t th e process is em ployed tojustify. A difficulty fo r any purely p ro ce d u ra list view, in clu d in g Rawlsian co n tra c t theory, is to d e fe n d th e p ro c e d u re in a m a n n e r th a t does n o t beg th e qu estio n this way.70
A rn eso n observes th a t th e re are as m any ideas o f exp lo itatio n as th e re a re views o n w hat constitutes fairness.71 P articu lar ju d g m e n ts a b o u t ex p lo itatio n th u s p re su p p o se som e id ea o f ju stice a n d so offer n o in d e p e n d e n t test o f any p ro ce d u ra list view. N onetheless, a n a d eq u ate proced u ralist view m u st provide for distinguishing perm issible fro m ex ploitative advantage-taking a n d m u st show th e la tte r to b e inim ical to th e fu n d a m e n ta l p ro c e d u re . We c a n n o t h e re offer a full ac c o u n t o f how ju stic e th ro u g h tru st co nceptualizes exploitation, w eighing th e p ersu a siveness o f th e m o d e l against p o te n tia l objections. B ut social c o n tractin g th ro u g h tru st is n o t a "o n e sh o t" deal, a n d th e ac c o u n t is "constructivist" in th e q u ite literal sense o f a b u ild in g process. So we can consider co n d itio n s that, given th e p a rtie s' differences, en able th e ir cooperative in te ra c tio n a n d th ereb y sh ape a g re e m e n t a m o n g th e m as well as p rac tices th a t n o u rish th e ir a g re e m e n t. 72 O n e co n d itio n is th a t p ro c e d u re a n d practices sh o u ld b e inclusive, fo r to tru st a n a g re e m e n t th e parties m u st have stan d in g in its devel 68 . In discussions of m odels of the social contract, this problem has b een u n d erex plored. Barry's work is a notew orthy exception; see ibid.
69. Rawls distinguishes betw een pure proceduralism , o n which there is no indepen d e n t criterion o f the right result, a n d perfect (or im perfect) proceduralism , in which a p rocedure is constructed to give the right result 
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o p m e n t. Second, p ro c e d u re a n d practices sh o u ld recognize a n d re sp o n d to p e o p le 's d ifferences w ith o u t disadvantaging th e m fo r being so, for to tru st a n a g re e m e n t th e parties m u st feel free to b e (a n d reveal) w ho they a re w hile p articip atin g in its d evelopm ent. T h ird , p ro c e d u re a n d p ractices sh o u ld en able p articip an ts to stre n g th e n each o th e r 's in v olvem ent a n d co m m itm en t, fo r th e parties n e e d to em b race principles th a t e n ab le th e ir in teractio n s to be ongoing. To tru st a n a g re e m e n t the p arties th u s m u st be able to p ro m o te th e stability o f its in flu en ce .73 (As a sen io r re se a rc h e r in to th e role o f h o rm o n e s in facilitating th e "ap p ro a c h b eh av io r" re q u ire d fo r tru st puts it: "If I abuse your tru st once o r twice, you are n o t going to tru st m e a th ird tim e even if I give you a h ig h dose o f oxytocin."74) To illustrate, these constraints (n o t a n exhaustive list) can be seen a t w ork in th e c h a n g e d a ttitu d e tow ard sh e lte re d w orkshops. D isabled p e o p le a re subject to excessively h ig h u n e m p lo y m e n t rates,75 so shel te re d w orkshops w ere c re a ted to p u t th e m to w ork, b u t su ch em p lo y m en t p a id a m u c h low er wage, o r assigned th e m to m u c h less esteem ed work, th a n re g u la r (in te g ra te d ) em p lo y m en t pro v id ed b o th n o n d isab le d a n d disabled p eo p le. B lind p e o p le w ere se n t to sh e lte re d w orkshops to m ake broom s, for exam ple. (Intellectually im p a ire d p e o p le still som etim es a re em ployed th ro u g h sh e ltere d arra n g e m e n ts.76) W ith th e ad v en t o f laws th a t invited disabled p e o p le in to o rd in a ry w orkplaces, however, sh e lte re d w orkshops cam e to be c o n d e m n e d as exploitative.77 U rging th e ir abo litio n , Jacobus tenB roek, fo u n d e r o f th e N ational F e d eratio n o f th e Blind, observed th a t th e N ational L ab o r R elations B oard refused to assert ju risd ic tio n over sh e lte re d w orkshops a n d th a t C ongress failed to e x te n d u n e m p lo y m e n t in su ra n ce o r m in im u m wage p ro te c tio n to p e o p le w ho w orked in th em . T h e system o f sh e lte re d w orkshops m ad e th e exclusion o f disabled individuals fro m th e re g u la r w orkforce pal atab le w hile d enying disabled w orkers benefits a n d p ro te ctio n s enjoyed by o th e r w orkers. T h e system c o rro d e d em ployers' dispositions to h o n o r co m m itm en ts to disabled w orkers a n d disabled p e o p le 's con fid en ce in th e la b o r system. T enB roek fu rth e r c o n d e m n e d sh elte red w orkshops for taking advantage o f disabled p eo p le in a way "A m erica . . . can ill afford to p e rp e tu a te ," co m m e n tin g th a t th e practice e ro d e d tru st in th e n a tio n 's pro fessed c o m m itm e n t to d em ocratic p rin cip les.78
In m o d e lin g th e a g re e m e n t process, co n tractin g th ro u g h b arg ain in g supposes th e p rin cip les for c o o p e ra tio n to b e p u t im m ediately in place. T h e p arties a re p o rtray ed as articulating, exam ining, a n d th e n selecting basic princip les. In contrast, co n tra ctin g th ro u g h tru st em phasizes th a t co operation-facilitating co n d itio n s develop over tim e, as social activity evolves to exem plify p rinciples o f co o p e ratio n th a t s tre n g th e n a n d system atize p e o p le 's n a tu ra l proclivities to d e p e n d on each other. P eo p le n e e d n o t b e able to articulate these principles, or to p o n d e r th em , to b e c o m m itted to th e m .79
Still, b a rg a in in g m ig h t be th o u g h t to be m o re basic to h u m a n social in te ra c tio n th a n tru st.80 T rust is, however, a fu n d a m e n ta l social m otivator.81 As we have arg u e d , such tru stin g m otivation is a fo u n d atio n al e le m e n t in b a rg ain in g itself, as well as in th e d ev e lo p m en t a n d pres ervatio n o f th e so rt o f p ro c e d u ra l fairness characteristic o fju stice. T h ere is g o o d reaso n to believe th a t tru st a n d o u r p e rc e p tio n o f ju stic e rise a n d fall together. B aier observes th a t a id in g p eo p le w ith fewer pow ers 78. Jacobus tenBroek, "The C haracter a n d Function of S heltered W orkshops," copy right 1995 by the N ational Federation of the Blind, posted o n the Web site of A Blind Net, http://w w w .blind.net/bg380001.htm .
79. Philosophical form ulations o f these principles will draw u p o n experience with trust-strengthening (and trust-destroying) practices, as well as the rapidly expanding u n derstanding o f the biology o f cooperative interaction. These principles will be aspirational, however, because they systematize com m itm ents to realizing conditions for inclusive co operative interaction.
80. See Baier, "Trust a n d A ntitrust," for an account o f primitive a n d basic trust. Baier identifies basic trust as "infant trust," the trust betw een babies a n d th eir parents. "To suppose that infants em erge from the womb already e quipped with some ur-confidence in what supports them . . . is plausible e n o u g h " (244). See also Carey, "H orm one Dose May Increase P eople's Trust in Strangers," for an account of how the level of the horm one associated with trust rises w hen individuals n e ed to d e p en d on o th er people, such as when a wom an approaches childbirth. to advance, as ju stic e usually is th o u g h t to e n jo in us to do, invites tru st.82 H e r in te rp re ta tio n o f H u m e reco n stru cts "his ac c o u n t o f th e artifices o f ju stic e as a n a c c o u n t o f th e progressive e n la rg e m e n t o f a clim ate o f tru st."83 B ut assistance to th e m o re vu ln erab le m u st m a in ta in dignity all ro u n d . B aier rem in d s us o f H u m e 's th o u g h t a b o u t m u tu al d e feren ce th a t serves a "p u rp o se sim ilar to th e rules o f ju stic e, a n d gives rise to in fo rm al rights o r d u e s" b ein g a key to m ain ta in in g tru st.84
So p rin cip les o fju stic e th a t p ro m o te re sp e ct for o th ers a n d p ro h ib it tre a tin g th e m as m e re m eans a re likely to be as significant fo r p e o p le c o n c e rn e d to facilitate a cu ltu re o f tru st as fo r p eo p le seeking th eir m u tu a l self-interest, o r even m o re so. Similarly significant for p eo p le c o n c e rn e d to sustain a clim ate o f tru st will be prin cip les calling for fair liberty a n d fair o pportunity. Ju stice o fte n has b e e n seen as th e m inim al individual c o m m itm e n t to w hich equally strong, sm art, a n d strategically m in d e d self-interested ag ents can accede. Ju stice also m ay be seen, how ever, as a p rin c ip le d practice th a t will be ag re ed to by oth er-reg ard in g agents o f very d iffe re n t abilities, d e p e n d in g o n o n e a n o th e r a n d seeking relatio n sh ip s th a t can be sustained. T h e g re a te r th e p ro p o rtio n o f in dividuals in th e p o p u la tio n w ho do n o t abuse each o th e rs' trust, a n d a re so perceived a n d affo rd ed re p u ta tio n s for constancy by o th ers,85 the m o re widely d istrib u te d is th e k in d o f social in fo rm atio n a b o u t trust w orthiness th a t u n d e rg ird s cooperative behavior.86 VIII. TRU STIN G (DISABLED) PEO PLE U nlike b arg ain in g , tru stin g is a h u m a n in te ra c tio n th a t n e ith e r req u ires so p h isticated ratio cin atio n , n o r relies o n o th e rs ' m aterial co n trib u tio n s, to co m p el constancy.87 Small c h ild re n can sense th e conseq u en ces o f 85. A detailed exploration o f how actions com e to be perceived as fair is beyond the scope o f this article. We should notice, however, th at even small children who cannot articulate m oral a n d political principles are sensitive to w hether the treatm en t m eted to them , a n d to others, is fair. Specifying principles derivable from the idea ofjustice through trust could be advanced, and nuanced, by em pirical studies th a t supply inform ation about how the recognition o f differences in people a n d of th eir different situations affects judgm ents of fairness. We should not assume, o f course, that how people do ju d g e fairness is how they ought to do so, but it is im portant, at the very least, for philosophers to engage with the differences th at people think m ake a difference.
86. See M ohtashem i and Mui, "Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by Social Inform ation."
87. The title of this section echoes the deliberate ambiguity o f Baier's title, "Trusting People," 137. b e in g in co n stan t, u n reliab le, o r dish o n est-th a t is, o f b ein g u n tru s tw orthy-well e n o u g h to be d e te rre d by them . So can m o st p eo p le with re d u c e d cognitive capacities. T rusting is essential to co n trac tin g but, u n lik e b arg ain in g , is accessible to alm ost everyone, w h e th e r disabled or n o n d isa b le d .88
Even th e m o st vu ln erab le individuals m ay be parties to tru st.89 T he trustw orthiness o f th e ir social a n d political situations will affect w h eth e r tru stin g is easy for th e m o r is, instead, terrifyingly difficult in virtue o f th e ir vulnerability.90 In d e e d , those least able to b arg ain successfully or secu re th e ir own in terests m ay b e th e m o st im p o rta n t particip an ts in cooperative schem es w h ere tru st ra th e r th a n c o m p etitio n is th e m ost im p o rta n t e lem en t. In this reg ard , in "Trust, Collective A ction, a n d the Law," K ah an re p o rts em pirical research th a t shows: T rust carries n o t only a n e le m e n t o f risk b u t also a n e le m e n t o f an ticip ato ry co n fid en ce. W hat b e tte r way to gain faith in o th e rs' will ingness to b e fair, a n d th us to be in d u c e d to co o p erate w ith them , th a n by observing th e ir w illingness to com m it a n d 90. It may be thought that certain kinds of disabilities, such as autism a n d paranoia, preclude trusting. This is n o t so, although it may take m uch m ore of an effort for people with these conditions to trust a n d an even g reater effort for others to deserve the con fidence o f people with these conditions. N o such hesitation should occur in regard to severely cognitively disabled people like Eva Kittay's dau g h ter Sesha, who clearly can trust a n d also withdraw trust w hen she finds it is not deserved. 
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October 2005 So p ractices th a t s tre n g th e n tru st do n o t exclude p eo p le w ith dis abilities to th e e x te n t th a t practices associated w ith b arg ain in g do. Fur ther, th e m u tu a l d e fe re n ce elicited by th e dynam ic o f trusting a n d being tru ste d sh o u ld in d u c e co n tracto rs to deal respectfully ra th e r th a n paternalistically w ith w hoever becom es d e p e n d e n t, for how ever sh o rt or lo n g a tim e. In d e e d , a p rin c ip le calling fo r th e m o st capable to give, or give over, to th e least capable a n d describing th e circum stances th e re o f well m ig h t b e called fo r to n o u rish a clim ate o f tru st by stre n g th e n in g fairness a n d ex te n d in g ju stice to everyone. T his p rin cip le w ould e n c o u rag e in d ire c t reciprocity, actin g w ith th e ex p ectatio n th a t o n e will be b e n e fite d n o t by th e actual recip ien ts o f o n e 's own g o o d d eeds b u t by stim u latin g a n e n v iro n m e n t in w hich p e o p le a re disposed to h elp e ach o th er.93 Such in d ire c t reciprocity m ay be m o re im p o rta n t th a n d ire c t reciprocity in th e evolution o f ju stic e .94
A sim ilar show ing c a n n o t b e m ad e fo r schem es o f distributive ju stic e th a t p ro ffer en title m e n ts to th e disabled. Such schem es can b re e d re s e n tm e n t by th e m o st capable, re q u ire d to transfer valuable resources to th e less capable w ith o u t e x p erien c in g any a d d e d value fo r them selves. R e se n tm e n t o n th e p a rt o f those called u p o n to give is a p ro b le m for red istributive th eo ries w ith goals such as achieving th re sh o ld levels o f capabilities fo r everybody. It is n o t sim ilarly p ro b lem atic fo r th eories w h ere o th er-reg ard in g c o n d u c t is p ro m o te d by a n d stren g th en s a g en erally beneficial tru st c u ltu re 's hold.
C h ild re n prize trustw orthiness in th e ir adults, n o r n e e d ad ults cal culate th e fu tu re benefits o f giving th e ir offspring this k in d o f security A nita Silvers shows that, given a procedural ra th e r th an a distributive reading, social contract theory can be com patible with com m unitarian versions o f virtue theory.
93. See R ichard D. Alexander, The Biology of Moral Systems (NewYork: Aldine de Gruyter, 1987); a n d M ohtashem i a n d Mui, "Evolution o f In direct Reciprocity by Social Inform ation," for discussions arguing for the centrality o f indirect reciprocity, ra th e r th an tit-for-tat exchanges, in the evolutionary stability o f cooperative schemes.
94. Bargaining usually is construed as a reciprocal dyadic interaction, a n d thus the cooperative schem es that are supposed to be bargained usually are th o u g h t to be consti tu te d by repetitions o f reciprocal dyadic interactions. But cooperative schem es involve m ore th an m ultiple instances o f direct reciprocity. To rationalize cooperation, indirect reciprocity is also required. Indirect reciprocity prom otes cooperative behavior absent expectations o f direct recom pense. Indirect reciprocity thus does n o t d e p en d o n inter actions betw een equals o r com parables able to benefit each o th er directly. Instead, the stability of a system o f indirect reciprocity depends on em ergent properties th at can be the product of interactions betw een unequals. T he view o f justice presented in this and succeeding sections takes justice to com e from the com plex and nuan ced relationships th at prom ote indirect reciprocity ra th e r th an simple and straightforw ard direct reciprocity. See M ohtashem i a n d Mui, "Evolution o f Indirect Reciprocity by Social Inform ation," for m ore on indirect reciprocity.
in o rd e r to be trustw orthy.95 B eing invested w ith a ch ild 's tru st is often sufficient c o n sid e ra tio n to b in d a n a d u lt to keep prom ises a n d to secure fidelity to th e c h ild 's w elfare. H ow individuals can shape prin cip les w ith o u t b arg ain in g is sug g ested by co n sid erin g h u m a n s' in teractio n s w ith anim als. I t is a stretch to th in k th a t anim als can b arg ain fo r o r even u n d e rsta n d m u tu a l advan tag e,97 b u t n o n e a t all to recognize th a t they can a n d do trust. P itc h e r's m arvelous story o f The Dogs Who Came to Stay describes how a feral an im al com es to tru st p e o p le an d , as im p o rtan t, b e tru sted by th e m .98 F ro m this a n d o th e r accounts o f developing tru st betw een p e o p le a n d anim als, we le a rn th e im p o rta n ce (o n b o th th e p a rtie s' parts) o f m u tu a l reliability a n d m u tu a l d eferen ce to each o th e r's unintelligible (fro m th e o th e r 's perspective) ways. T h e parties le a rn w h at behaviors they m u st ex h ib it to g ain a n d h o ld th e o th e r 's trust. A n a n im a l's par ticip atio n in such tru st b u ild in g th e re fo re shapes th e p rin cip les th a t g u id e th e re la tio n sh ip despite th e a n im a l's inability to re fle ct o n a n d articu late th o se princip les. Som e n o n h u m a n anim als thus can be active 95 . Some writers define trusting in term s of calculating probabilities that others will perform as expected. See Diego Gam betta, ed., Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (New York: Blackwell, 1988), 217; a n d Piotr Sztompka, Trust: A Sociological Theory (Cam bridge: Cam bridge University Press, 1999), 25. If this is a correct definition, people with reasoning capabilities so lim ited th a t they cannot calculate, can n o t trust. Notice, however, that we have no trouble supposing that small babies a n d large anim als are capable o f trust. Even people with severe cognitive deficits are capable of trust. Consequently, if trust, ra th e r th an bargaining, is the fundam ental way in which individuals participating in social contracting n e e d to relate, even severely disabled people are capable in principle o f participating.
96. See Gregory Pollock and Lee Alan Dugatkin, "Reciprocity a n d the E m ergence of R eputation," Journal of Theoretical Biology 159 (1992): 25-37.
97. The practice of inducing anim als to perform for a rew ard may verge on being a kind o f bargaining. T he psychologist who reneges on the established paym ent of grapes is unlikely to keep his lab chim ps problem-solving for long. T he dog train er who omits the expected treat or praise w on't long have a properly p erform ing anim al. Like hum ans, however, some anim als work for the pleasure o f the activities ra th e r th an the rewards, as anyone watching a b o rd e r collie keeping its sheep in line can readily observe. Young dogs are selected to be train ed for h erd in g o n the basis o f the enthusiasm they initially show for bossing aro u n d sheep.
98. George Pitcher a n d Tom George, The Dogs Who Came to Stay (New York: Penguin, 1996). Thanks are owed to Je ff M cMahan, who first m en tio n ed this book in regard to an earlier version of the article a n d who urged the article's enlargem ent to say m ore about how justice th ro u g h trust may account for o u r obligations to animals. P itch er's technique for gaining the d o g 's trust included self-constraints rem iniscent of the deference a n d selfdisem pow erm ent Baier recom m ends for trust building am ong hum ans. p articip an ts in sh ap in g p rin cip les th a t n u rtu re a clim ate o f trust, despite th e ir inability to reaso n a b o u t th e p rinciples th e ir behavior b o th suggests a n d endorses.
W hat, th e n , is ow ed to n o n h u m a n anim als th a t are capable o f trust? We h u m a n s in ten tio n ally p e rm it a n d en co u ra g e anim als to place th e ir tru st in us. In som e cases, such as w ith dogs, we selected wild anim als to dom esticate by b rin g in g th e young in to o u r co m m u n al sites so they cam e to tru st a h u m a n family as a re p la c e m en t for th e ir pack o r h erd . In o th e r cases, anim als m o re actively choose to be in th e relationship. F or exam ple, as h u m a n s tu rn e d to ag riculture, cats b e g an to patro n ize h u m a n co m m u n ities to d in e o n th e m ice p o p u la tin g h u m a n fo o d re positories. O nly anim als p o sitio n ed to tru st h u m a n s can be owed trust w orthiness in h u m an s, b u t we sh o u ld no tice th a t we h u m a n s position anim als so by placing ourselves in close en o u g h co n ju n ctio n to th em to alter th e ir p re d a to ry o r defensive behavior.99 In this reg ard , th e clear est case for th e injustice o f eating anim als p ertain s to th e individual anim als w ith w hich we have fo rg ed th e stro n g e st b o n d s o f trust, namely, o u r pets.
C h ild re n w ho to rtu re anim als o ften grow in to adults w ho tre a t o th e r p e o p le cruelly. T h e m a n w ho w hips his m aln o u rish e d fallen carthorse strikes us as so m e o n e to avoid in d o in g business. T hese exam ples suggest th a t h u m a n e tre a tm e n t affo rd ed anim als co n trib u tes to a tru st clim ate a n d th ereb y en h a n c e s h u m a n s' con fid en ce in how o th e r h u m a n s will tre a t th em . Justice fo r anim als thus can be se e n as im p o rta n t to bu ild in g co n fid en ce in a n d co m m itm ents to h u m a n justice.
Basing ju stic e o n co n tra ctin g w ith tru st m akes th e ju stic e o f eating anim als d e p e n d o n w h at in flu en ce d o in g so has o n o u r tru stin g each o th e r a n d o n anim als tru stin g us. P eople differ a b o u t w h e th e r killing anim als for fo o d is so categorically in h u m a n e th a t it shakes a clim ate o f tru st to th e core o r w h e th e r th e p ractice m ainly affects tru st w hen ex ecu ted cruelly.100 T his d eep division o f o p in io n a b o u t th e social im p act 99. O n the understanding of justice based o n contracting with trust, we c an 't talk about there having been obligations o f justice to anim als in precivilized times before the dom estication o f animals. Further, we can 't talk a bout obligations o f justice to animals extending to preservation o f th eir species, although we may have obligations to others th at contingently com m it us to biodiversity a n d therefore to preservation o f species. We m ight in justice have such a duty to individual dogs, although not to the canine species.
100. We draw the line differently in the case of hum ans, fo r (almost) no one thinks th at killing hum ans escapes being inhum ane. Nevertheless, people differ in regard to this m atter as they do in regard to animals, with som e claim ing th at all killing o f hum ans is inhum ane, while others h o ld th at in rare situations o f unbearable pain it is the hum ane thing to do. T hat contracting with trust reflects society's c u rre n t collective indecision about such m atters is no objection to it. o f eatin g anim als partly explains th e p ro fo u n d ly u n se ttle d state o f ju d g m e n t a b o u t th e ju stic e o f eatin g anim als.
IX. (R E)M O D ELIN G T H E SOCIAL CONTRACT
In sum , a social c o n tra c t a p p ro a c h to ju stic e n e e d n o t tu rn to barg ain in g to m o d el th e h u m a n in te ra c tio n basic for social c o o p e ra tio n .101 Bar g ain in g som etim es occurs d u rin g co n trac tin g b u t n e e d n o t. In contrast, s tre n g th e n in g tru st is a crucial e le m e n t o f c o n trac tin g .102 A nd tru st is a relatio n sh ip th a t can be fo rged n o t only betw een equals b u t also betw een individuals w ho fit th e successful b a rg a in e r p arad ig m a n d individuals w ho d o n o t fit th e p a ra d ig m because they are tem p o rarily o r p e rm a n en tly pow erless o r a re m u c h m o re lim ited th a n is species-typical for hu m an s.
P ro p e r p rin cip les o f ju stic e can stre n g th e n trust, even for individ uals w ho, in H u m e 's w ords, do n o t have any kindness fo r o n e a n o th e r.103 T h e im p o rta n c e o f allaying th e fears o f H u m e 's fam ous fa rm e r w ith the yet-to-ripen c o rn illustrates why social co o p era tio n is so b o u n d u p with tru st a n d why ju stic e in th e service o f tru st m u st provide fo r individuals in d ep endency. A b sen t trust, th e fa rm e r in H u m e 's story refuses even tem p o rarily to to lerate a p o sitio n o f d e p e n d e n c e a n d pow erlessness. H e sim ply will n o t co o p e ra te in th e harvest-because h e c a n n o t tolerate p u ttin g h im self in a p o sitio n very like th e o n e occu p ied by m any disabled p eo p le. By e n ab lin g his n e ig h b o r w ith already rip e n e d co rn to com plete harvesting, h e gives th e n e ig h b o r in d e p e n d e n c e w hile re m a in in g h im self d e p e n d e n t o n th e n e ig h b o r fo r h elp w h en th e tim e fo r his own h arvest arrives. A bsent a cu ltu re a n d a clim ate o f trust, h e will n o t h elp to h arvest his n e ig h b o r's already rip e n e d corn, for d o in g so w ould u p set th e balan ce b etw een his own a n d his n e ig h b o r's power.
As H u m e 's instructive story shows, d ep e n d en c y is a t th e h e a rt o f trust. Cultivating tru st en ables co o p e ratio n in circum stances o f u n e q u a l power, ju s t w here N ussbaum places th e disabled. N ussbaum u n d e rsta n d s h u m a n s as political anim als w hose interests a re b o u n d u p w ith each o th e r despite th e asym m etry o f th e ir d e p e n d e n c ies a n d powers. This em phasis is well taken, as m u c h so w hen ju stic e is viewed fro m the perspective o f social c o n tra c t th eo ry as for th e capabilities a p p ro ac h . 101 . We think that m any well-known versions of social co n tract-based justice will be com patible with, although slightly o r even greatly changed by, (re)m odeling the contract ing process to m ake trusting, ra th e r th an bargaining, the paradigm atic h u m an relation. But for this article we m ust put aside exploring these implications.
102. For a useful account o f the role th a t trust, a n d especially the venerable rendering o f it as fides, plays in the political th o u g h t of Locke a n d o th er theorists of his time, see J o h n D unn, "Trust a n d Political Agency," in Gam betta, Trust: M aking and Breaking Coop erative Relations, 73-91.
103. David H um e, Treatise, bk. 3, pt. 2, sec. 5.
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Ball re m in d s us th a t co n tra c t th eo ry in its earliest historical form was m otivated by th e fact th a t all are vuln erab le to all a n d th e refo re individuals' in terests a re b o u n d to g e th e r in p u rsu it o f a protective social o rd e r.104 T h e v u lnerabilities o f p eo p le w ith disabilities a re n o t a special case, h e argues. O u r discussion h e re adds to B all's th e th o u g h t th a t disabled individuals can have special significance in cooperative schem es. F or p e o p le 's tru st in w h e th e r a society really u n d e rsta n d s a n d is c o m m itted to ju stic e is in flu e n c e d by w h e th e r in ferio r tre a tm e n t o f th e d isabled a n d o th e r "o u tliers" is p ro h ib ite d o r p e rm itte d .105 T his is n o t to m ake th e disabled in to a special case b u t to p o in t o u t why the way they typically are tre a te d is im p o rta n t to social co n tractors generally. 106 As O 'N eill a rg u e d in h e r 2002 R eith L ectures, placing tru st well a n d refu sin g it wisely are crucial to m a in tain in g a progressive political c u ltu re .107 O 'N eill's assessm ent o f th e political im p o rtan c e o f tru st ac cords w ith B aier's a rg u m en ts a b o u t its m o ra l im p o rtan ce. Even th o u g h tru stin g a n d trustw orthiness are risky a n d h a rd , practices th a t b u ild p u b lic tru st are basic to dem ocracy because they m o d e l ju stic e o n in teractive citizenship r a th e r th a n passive citizenship w ith state-delivered e n titlem en ts.
R eplacing b a rg ain in g w ith b u ild in g tru st may n o t seem like a radical p o litical m ove because it retain s th e fram e o f tra d itio n al social c o n tract theory. N evertheless, prizing a n d p ro m o tin g a cu ltu re o f tru st m o re passionately p ro m p ts practical progress tow ard im proving justice. T he p rin cip les o f ju stic e fo rm u la ted th ro u g h a n d fo r tru st will n o t be con c e rn e d w ith equally e n ric h in g th e individual interests o f th e parties b u t w ith effectively stre n g th e n in g th e b o n d s betw een them . F or th e process o f c o m m ittin g to th e co n tract, so u n d e rsto o d , disinclines th e parties to be d o m in a te d by self-regarding reasons a n d facilitates th e prim acy o f o th er-reg ard in g m o tivation in th e ir political as well as th e ir m o ral lives. T hus, w h en co n tra c tin g w ith trust, co n tracto rs will n o t ask w h at they have to give over to o th e r p eo p le to secu re advantage. T hey will in stead ask w hat they m u st ch an ge a b o u t them selves (a n d a b o u t th e political stru c tu re th a t p o sitions th em ) so th a t o th e rs can b e c o n fid e n t in them .
X. C O N C LU SIO N O nly rarely d o early versions o f social co n tra c t th e o ry explicitly portray th e p rin cip les o f ju stic e as p ro d u c e d by sw apping, trad in g u p , tit for tat, o r o th e r b a rg a in in g activities. To a large d eg ree, th e barg ain in g m o d e l is a n e m e n d a tio n by m o re re c e n t w riters w ho may have b e e n in flu e n c e d by n arro w legal definitions o f contracts as exch an g e rela tionships. O n ce lib e ra te d fro m th e b a rg a in e r p aradigm , social c o n tra ct th e o ry gains th e p o te n tia l to d o ju stic e fo r disabled p eo p le w ith o u t giving way to care th e o ry o r capability th eo ry (alth o u g h b o th care th eo ry a n d capability th e o ry still m ay be very useful su p p le m e n ts108).
N evertheless, we m ay ask how ju stic e th ro u g h tru st w ould fare in re g a rd to th e original objective o f social c o n tra c t theory. D oes tru st p ro m o tio n , like successful b argaining, provide reasons for giving up liberties to facilitate social co o p eratio n ? B argaining offers th e o p p o r tunity to sh ap e a society so ag reeable as to re d u c e n ee d s to exercise the liberty to dem ur. Yet if ag reeable a rra n g e m en ts are th e aim , th e bar g ain in g m o d el p erm its us to reserve th e liberty to act as I wish, ra th e r th a n as I sh o u ld , as lo n g as d o in g so does n o t je o p a rd iz e co n tra cted co o p eratio n . So th e b arg ain seem s only provisional, a c o n c e rn fo r b o th o p p o n e n ts a n d p ro p o n e n ts o f social co n tra c t theory. 109 R educe th e cu ltu re o f suspicion by cultivating trust, however, a n d H u m e 's fa rm e r will b e less likely to re a c t suspiciously to giving over his liberty. W h at H u m e a n farm ers a n d th e re st o f us will fin d is th a t doing o th e rs ju stic e because o f th e ir tru st in o n e 's own self, a n d having con fid en ce th a t ju stic e will be d o n e to us for th e sam e reason, feels like g ain in g ra th e r th a n giving u p pow er.110 In this reg ard , tru stin g a n d being tru ste d m ay b e a n especially in ten se ex p erien ce for p eo p le w ith dis abilities a n d for o th e r outliers.
F ro m th e perspective o f b ein g especially vulnerable, as m o st dis ab led p e o p le are, giving over tru st to o th ers is risky a n d h ard , yet lib eratin g . C oncom itantly, to b e tru sted ra th e r th a n c o n tro lled despite
